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TitleWorld Orders, Development and Transformation
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Table of Contents
                            Cover
Contents
List of Table
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
1 Introduction
Part I: World Orders and Development Discourses
	2 Analytical Framing
	3 World Orders, Development Discourse and Coloniality
	4 State, World Order and Development: Malawi and South Korea
Part II: Neo-liberal and Securitizing World Order: Debating Transformation
	5 Global Governance
	6 Russia, China, Africa and Multi-polarity
	7 Human Security, Neo-liberalism and Securitization of Development
	8 World Social Forum
	9 Epilogue: Global Financial Crisis, Barack Obama’s Presidency and World Order
Notes
Bibliography
Index
                        
Document Text Contents
Page 2

International Political Economy Series

General Editor: Timothy M. Shaw, Professor and Director, Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, The University of the West Indies, Trinidad & Tobago

Titles include:

Leslie Elliott Armijo (editor)
FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN EMERGING MARKETS

Robert Boardman
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURE
Environmental Debates and the Social Sciences

Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes (editors)
THE MILITARY AS AN ECONOMIC ACTOR
Soldiers in Business

Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (editors)
DEVELOPMENT, CIVIL SOCIETY AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
Bridging the Sacred and the Secular

Gordon Crawford
FOREIGN AID AND POLITICAL REFORM
A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality

Matt Davies
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN CHILE
National Intellectuals and Transnational Hegemony

Martin Doornbos
INSTITUTIONALIZING DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND RESOURCE STRATEGIES IN EAST-
ERN AFRICA AND INDIA
Developing Winners and Losers

Fred P. Gale
THE TROPICAL TIMBER TRADE REGIME

Meric S. Gertler and David A. Wolfe
INNOVATION AND SOCIAL LEARNING
Institutional Adaptation in an Era of Technological Change

Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins
REINVENTING ACCOUNTABILITY
Making Democracy Work for the Poor

Andrea Goldstein
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES FROM EMERGING ECONOMIES
Composition, Conceptualization and Direction in the Global Economy

Mary Ann Haley
FREEDOM AND FINANCE
Democratization and Institutional Investors in Developing Countries

Keith M. Henderson and O. P. Dwivedi (editors)
BUREAUCRACY AND THE ALTERNATIVES IN WORLD PERSPECTIVES

Jomo K.S. and Shyamala Nagaraj (editors)
GLOBALIZATION VERSUS DEVELOPMENT

Angela W. Little
LABOURING TO LEARN
Towards a Political Economy of Plantations, People and Education in Sri Lanka

Page 142

Russia, China, Africa and Multi-polarity 129

dominated the Chinese state’s position. Representations of the domi-
nant states and institutions in the world order did not welcome this
position. With the passing of a resolution to build a socialist market
economy at the ruling party’s fourteenth congress in 1992, which built
on Deng Xiaoping’s claims from his now famous tour in special eco-
nomic zones that ‘under socialist conditions, China could also build a
market economy’, an opening emerged for the negotiations to move
forward (Yongming, 2007: 101).

More importantly, given the contentious history of trade between
China and the USA and the politico-economic power of the latter in the
world order, the signing of a market access bilateral agreement between
the two countries close to the WTO’s Ministerial meeting in Seattle pro-
vided a major boost for China’s push to join the WTO (Barfield and
Groombridge, 2003: 31). This development was important not only for
the USA but also for China. Dominant states in the world order such as
the USA considered the country ‘too big and too potentially important
to be allowed in on its own terms’, mainly because of its commitment
to secure access to overseas markets especially US ones (Breslin, 2007:
93). In addition, the country was worried about new stipulations emerg-
ing out of the Doha trade negotiations that would make entry to the
WTO difficult (ibid.). In early 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation reconfigured the country’s legal and trade reg-
ulatory framework in line with WTO principles, a process that resulted
in the dismantling of 573 laws, changes to 120 existing laws and the
creation of 26 new laws (Yongming, 2007: 103). By the end of that
year, China joined WTO, a development that illustrates the state’s com-
mitment to deepening its economic strategies in trade, investment and
agricultural arenas along neo-liberal lines.

The Chinese state’s adoption of multilateral practices marks a signif-
icant shift from its earlier emphasis on self-reliance and isolation in
order to meet its national objectives. As Su Change argues, ‘historically
the Chinese state viewed multilateralism as a constraint. . . . Yet today
China plays an active role in the multilateral security dialogue on the
North Korea nuclear problem, and is promoting the establishment of
the ASEAN+3 Free Trade Zone. The Shanghai Six is the first international
organization that China has helped establish since 1840, and reflects
the important role of multilateral diplomacy in current Chinese foreign
relations’ (2007: 71). For the Chinese state, practices of multilateralism
and joining international institutions are important tools in its strug-
gle for domestic and international legitimacy and its emergence as a
global power. As Yong Deng states ‘only when greater international

Page 143

130 Neo-liberal and Securitizing World Order

legitimacy as a rising great power can China enjoy a lasting benign
strategic environment wherein it is no longer suspected as the most
likely revisionist power bent on violently restructuring the international
arrangement . . . These features are eminently manifested in China’s
international strategy, which puts a premium on generally status-quo-
oriented constructive activism’ (2005: 62–63). Essentially, as one analyst
has posited, China ‘will never be a nation that is satisfied with only food
and shelter’ thus expanding its capacity on all fronts and emerging as
a global power is the end goal of its current politico-economic project
(Wang, 2006: 23).

Overall, the Chinese state considers the maintenance of the current
world order as crucial to its attainment of its strategic national inter-
ests of economic modernization through market capitalism and rise as a
global power. In this regard, China ‘appears to be betting its future on its
efforts within the current international political and economic system’
for to achieve its modernization goals, including its commitment to
‘catching with the West’, access to Western capital, technology and mar-
kets is vital (ibid.: 22). Consequently, to achieve these goals, China can
ill avoid antagonizing the dominant states in the world order especially
the USA (Zhimin, 2007: 57). Further, because the Chinese state has so far
achieved its politico-economic objectives within the modalities of cur-
rent world order, its collaborative tendency to this order suits its agenda
(ibid.). Thus, while Chinese ruling elites and organic intellectuals con-
tinue to invoke their commitment to multi-polarization, an aggressive
counter-hegemonic attack on America’s hegemony and other dominant
states in the contemporary world order, in order to create a foundation
for a multi-polar world order, is not on their agenda at the current junc-
ture. Rather the Chinese state’s anti-hegemonism discourse seems to be
limited to the containment of America’s ‘unilateralism and power pol-
itics in the name of promoting democratization’ (Deng, 2005: 65) and
other US political projects. In this respect, the UN provides China with
a political space ‘to forge some international checks on the excessive use
of American power’ (Zhimin, 2007: 56).

To conclude, the foregoing analysis suggests that while anti-
hegemonism remains an aspect of the Chinese state’s ideology, the state
is mainly committed to the stability of the core features of the cur-
rent world order rather than their transformation. Given this approach
to the world order, it is unlikely that China will emerge as a counter-
veiling power structure to this order at this conjuncture. This does not,
however, stop Chinese elites from claiming that China is committed to
the emergence of a multi-polar world, in addition to being a champion

Page 284

Index 271

Watkins, K., 158
WB, see World Bank
Weberian bureaucratic instrumental

rationality, 60
Weil, R., 126
Weitz, R., 109
Wenping, H., 133
White, S., 24
Whitworth, S., 106, 148
Wilde, J. De., 146
Wohlforth, W. C., 222
Wolf, E. F., 51
Wollstonecraft, M., 153
Woods, N., 103, 106
workers’ rights, 39
World Bank Research News, 41
World Bank

creation of, 27–8
publications contributing to

neo-liberal ideas, 41
role in decline of public education

in Africa, 152
role in evolution of global

development knowledge,
14–16

role in rise of neo-liberalism, 40
see also epistemic community

World Economic Forum (Davos 2009),
215

World Economic Forum, 180
world order, new, 33

anti-communism, 29–30
decolonization process, 29
geopolitics of the Cold War, 29
institutions of global governance,

27
politico-economic ideas, 29–33

world order, shifts in
in 1970s, 38
end of Cold War, 41–2, factors

leading to; institutions of global
governance, 41–2; neo-liberal
economic thought and practice,
40–1; self-regulating market
doctrine, 39–40

world order, transformation of, 20
world orders, 9–14

characteristics of, 9–10, 16–17
institutionalization of, 14–16

neo-Gramscian critical theory
framework of, analytical entry
point, 9–10, 16–17, 20

World Social Forum (WSF), 177–93
and alternatives to neo-liberalism,

186–90; deglobalization and
decommodification strategies,
187; democratization of
institutions of global
governance, 188–89

Charter of Principles, 182, 189
challenges to, 190–3
and contestation against

neo-liberalism; expansion of
corporate capitalism, 183;
marginalization of social
forces in North and South,
184; rising inequalities
between North and South,
184–5

emergence in Porto Alegre, Brazil,
180, 191–2

expansion of, 189
World Social Forum,

counter-hegemonic movement,
3, 14

World Trade Organization (WTO), 14,
41

collapse of negotiations in Cancun,
99

contestation against, 179
Worth, O., 119
WSF, see World Social Forum

(WSF)
WTO, see World Trade Organization

(WTO)

yangban, 79, 84
Yeltsin, Boris President, 113–15,

117–18
adoption of neo-liberal economics,

114
shock-therapy economic policies,

114–15; social dislocations
generated by, 116

Yi dynasty, 76, 77
Yongming, F., 129
YPFB, see Bolivia State Oil Corporation

(YPFB)

Page 285

272 Index

zaibatsu, 88
Zald, N. M., 232
Zambia

China’s involvement in, 139, 140
contestation against neo-liberalism,

177
Zedong, M., 123, 126
Zexu, L., 54
Zghal, A., 177

Zhimin, C., 127, 130
Zhongyuan Petroleum Company,

139
Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister, 131
Zimbabwe

China’s involvement in, 132, 139,
140

war on terror, 171
Zinn, H., 228

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