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TitleWhat Makes the EU Viable?: European Integration in the Light of the Antebellum US Experience
Author
LanguageEnglish
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Total Pages245
Table of Contents
                            1 The Problem of Viability in a Compound Polity
	1.1 Introduction
	1.2 Viability as defined in relation to the 'Rules of the Game' of politics
	1.3 Scenarios of viability in a compound polity
	1.4 The theory of the compound polity and the issue of the units' sovereign status
	1.5 Comparing the EU with other political systems
	1.6 Conclusion
2 Developing an Analogical Comparison between the EU and the Antebellum US Republic
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 The attraction of transatlantic comparison
	2.3 The caesura of the Civil War: The overlooked significance of antebellum political conflict
	2.4 Comparing viability in the EU and antebellum US: A question of praxis not preconditions
	2.5 Conclusion: Learning through analogy
3 Comparing How the Rules of the Game are Contested
	3.1 Introduction
	3.2 Viability and the conflict over the rules of the game of politics in the antebellum US
	3.3 Contesting the rules of the game in the EU
		3.3.1 Dual federalism v. joint federalism
		3.3.2 A constitution for popular government v. a treaty system
		3.3.3 A project for freedom v. a project for undefined ever closer union
		3.3.4 A single fault line v. multiple fault lines
		3.3.5 A party system and Supreme Courtarbitrator v. politics of treaty reform and council arbitration
3.4 Conclusion
4 The Struggle to Maintain a Compound System:Creating and Contesting the Rules of the Game in European Integration
	4.1 Introduction
	4.2 The construction of the rules of the game of European politics, from the ECSC to the EEC
		4.2.1 The Coal and Steel Community
		4.2.2 The European Economic Community
	4.3 After the EEC: Unexpected constitutionalization(ECJ), the first enlargement (UK) and democratic consolidation (Mediterranean enlargement)
		4.3.1 The impact of the court on the rules of the game
		4.3.2 British accession: Opening up the Pandora's box of domestic politics
		4.3.3 The Mediterranean enlargement round: Defining the Community's democratic values
	4.4 Maastricht and after: Questioning the purpose and nature of integration
	4.5 Two steps forward but how many back? European integration's dynamic equilibrium
	4.6 Conclusion
5 Contrasting and Explaining the Viability of Two Compound Systems
	5.1 Introduction
	5.2 American dual federalism (with the highest functionsof government) v. European joint federalism (with the most numerous)
	5.3 A constitution for popular government v. a treaty system
	5.4 A project for freedom (the union as a meansto an end) v. a project for undefined ever closer union (integration as an end in itself )
	5.5 A single fault line v. multiple fault lines
	5.6 A party system and Supreme Court arbitrator v. politics of treaty reform and Council arbitration
	5.7 Conclusion: Recognizing what makes the EU viable
6 The Future Evolution of the EU Compound Polity: The Obstacles to Voluntary Centralization
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 Dynamic equilibrium: A self-reinforcing process?
	6.3 Compound polities and the problem of representing both states and individuals
	6.4 How to manage the voluntary centralization of representation
	6.5 The political process needed for justifying voluntary centralization
	6.6 Conclusion
Conclusion: Implications for EU Studies and the Debate over the Future of Integration
	Applying the insights of this study
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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	B
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	D
	E
	F
	G
	H
	I
	J
	K
	L
	M
	N
	O
	P
	Q
	R
	S
	T
	U
	V
	W
	Y
	Z
                        
Document Text Contents
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What Makes the EU Viable?

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The Struggle to Maintain a Compound System 109

To conclude this overview of the European compound polity’s
dynamic equilibrium it is necessary to make a few points about the
Constitutional Treaty and its successor, the Lisbon Treaty. These docu-
ments close the circle rather neatly as they both mimic the Maastricht
Treaty’s sidestepping of fundamental tensions yet nevertheless introduce
certain new innovations allowing for a greater possibility of governing
in common.

The Lisbon Treaty thus belongs to this logic of dynamic equilibrium
because it too fails to transform the EU into a compound polity where
the rules of the game have become subject to voluntary centralization.
From the outset the 2005 Constitutional Treaty, whose contents are
for the most part reproduced in the Lisbon Treaty, was encumbered
with the relics of previous compromises and failures. The three essen-
tial tasks that the Nice Treaty had made no progress on concerned
establishing the role of national parliaments, clarifying the legal status
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights promulgated in 2000 by a
special convention (it reiterated the European commitment to high
social protection but its legal status was unclear)46 and the division of
competences (Dehousse, 2005).

Table 4.1 Evolution of the rules of the game in the EU according to the logic of
dynamic equilibrium

Rules of the game Changes amounting to dynamic equilibrium

Institutional
competences

Greater competences conferred but new safeguards
introduced: Opt-outs, the principle of subsidiarity,
insulating the second and third pillars from the
Commission and ECJ.

Expectations about
the union

Founding objectives remain: Prosperity, peace and
democracy. Enduring ambiguity over others: Social policy
and security policy still only possibilities. No final end
point to integration specified.

Competency over
competences

Despite principle of primacy, location of competency
over competences ambiguous. ECJ denied this role in
second and third pillar and ignored when Germany and
France broke Stability and Growth Pact.

Representation Introduction of supranational co-decision compensated
by maintenance of national vetoes in first pillar. In
the absence of European parties and successful indirect
legitimation, national referendums used to sanction
treaty reform according to confederal principle of
representation.

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110 What Makes the EU Viable?

Integrating the national parliaments into EU decision making serves
a twofold purpose. Firstly, it is intended to act as a system for monitor-
ing the hitherto feckless subsidiarity mechanism as it gives the member
states enhanced power to challenge legislation if a third (a quarter in
certain areas) of the parliaments decide that EU action fails to comply
with the subsidiarity principle. Parliaments have also been granted the
right to take the Commission to the ECJ for breaches of the subsidiarity
principle. European institutions will have to transmit legislative drafts
to domestic parliaments and ensure that ‘the reasons for concluding
that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be
substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indi-
cators’ (Lisbon Treaty, protocol on subsidiarity, Article 5). The second
purpose behind linking parliaments to European governance is to
improve citizens’ faith in the mechanism of democratic control over
the EU. This comes not only from the regular transmission of informa-
tion from European institutions to domestic legislatures but also in the
procedure for allowing a national parliament to veto a move to QMV
(Lisbon Treaty, Article 48) under the ‘simplified revision procedure’,
which makes this fundamental change possible without treaty renego-
tiation. By tying the transfer from unanimity to QMV to parliamentary
life the assumption is that this will generate domestic party debate,
which if successful will confer the direct democratic legitimacy lacking
in a distant and indirect Council decision.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted as a way of killing
two birds with one stone: to provide a corpus of common values as
the basis for a putative European identity and to incorporate a bundle
of social and economic rights to maintain the political pressure for a
‘social Europe’ with a regulated market. It forms the basis for a posi-
tive vision of integration as opposed to deregulation. Needless to say,
this charter was only integrated into the Constitutional Treaty after a
hard-fought compromise that diluted its possible implications for the
harmonization of social policy. The charter only applies when countries
implement European law (Lisbon Treaty, II-111. 1), meaning that it can-
not create rights for individuals except in those areas where the EU is
already competent. In case this declaration of rights leads to pressures
for expanding their applicability, the wary member states have specified
that it ‘does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union’
(Lisbon Treaty, II-111.2).

Under great pressure from the UK and Ireland, each controversial
article referring to economic and social rights, which come under

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Index 231

state-building, 32–5, 156
see also nation state

state, definition of, 8
states-union, see compound polity
Steed, Michael, 91
Stone Sweet, Alec, 103, 106
subsidiarity, 100–2, 104, 109–10, 151,

171–2, 186
supranationalism, 79, 111, 114,

155–7, 159, 167, 169, 172–3,
177, 186

see also intergovernmentalism
Switzerland, 4, 11, 27–8, 122

Tallmadge, James, 132–3
Taney, Roger, 59
tariff controversy, 116, 120, 126–7, 162

see also South Carolina,
nullification crisis

Texas, 133–4
Thatcher, Margaret, 97

Bruges speech, 97
Thatcherism, 80
Tilly, Charles, 34
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 12, 22, 33,

46–7, 50–1, 71, 74, 150
traité de procédures, 81
traité de règles, 81
Turkey

invasion of Cyprus, 94
possible accession to EU, 2, 45, 154

Tyler, John, 134

United Kingdom, 149, 156
accession to EEC, 87–93
Labour Party, 89–90

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
fall of, 97–8
post-war threat from, 11, 75–6, 78

United Nations
Security Council membership, 156

United States of America,
antebellum period, see antebellum

United States
Articles of Confederation, 20, 29, 38,

39, 69, 133, 141, 143, 168, 173
Civil War, 3, 14, 22, 32, 37, 39–41,

43, 55–6, 60–2, 67, 128, 139–40,
153, 184, 186–7

Congress, 41–2, 57–8, 60, 62, 70,
115, 120, 127, 132–5, 139–40,
143, 145–6, 162, 165, 178

Constitution, see United States
Constitution

Declaration of Independence, 56,
61, 69, 119, 125

Democratic Party, 134, 141, 142
Electoral College, 40, 67, 121, 132,

137, 139–41, 144, 146, 165
exceptionalism, 3, 36, 187
first party system, 139
House of Representatives, 133–4,

140, 165
Judiciary Act (1875), 43
Mexican war (1846–1848), 61–2
New Deal, 123, 187
Reconstruction era, 31, 39–41, 60–2,

113, 123, 147
Republican Party, founding of, 59,

145–6
role of presidency, 28, 67–8, 141,

161, 187
second party system, 140–44, 146,

167
Senate, 58–9, 79, 116, 120, 126,

132–5, 143–4, 163, 169
slavery issue, 5, 55, 58–60, 62, 70,

124, 131–7, 139, 142–7, 150, 154,
161–3, 167, 173

Supreme Court, 39–43, 56–7, 59,
62, 71, 119, 138–9, 146, 164, 170,
186–7

war with Britain (1812–14), 57, 61,
162

War of Secession, see under Civil War
Whig Party, 142, 144–5

United States Constitution, 17, 20,
22, 28–30, 38–40, 56–8, 60–1,
65, 67–70, 113, 115–20, 124–7,
136, 143, 147, 150, 162–3, 165,
167–8, 178

amendments to, 16, 22, 40–2, 56–8,
62, 67, 71, 115, 120, 132–5, 139,
143, 146, 164, 168, 178

Bill of Rights, 41, 56, 115
compact theory of, 14, 40–2, 54–5,

56, 60, 116, 120, 163, 164
ratification of, 24, 39, 120, 178

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232 Index

United States Constitution (Contd.)
three-fifths rule, 124, 132, 142
see also Philadelphia Convention

Utah, 135

Van Buren, Martin, 141–2, 165
Van Duyn case (1973), 83
Van Gend en Loos case (1963), 82–4
Venice, republic of, 34
viability

as basis for comparison between EU
and antebellum US, 5–6, 32–52

definition of, 7–11, 15
and dynamic equilibrium, 151, 160
in EU, 1–4, 13, 16, 19, 23, 31, 87,

113–4, 153, 155, 160–1, 168, 173,
180, 182–4, 186

and rules of the game, 23, 29, 54,
58, 68, 182

scenarios of, 15–6, 18–9, 64–5
see also compound polity
in US, 4, 32, 147, 161, 165, 173

Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 124

voting procedures, 16, 169–70
first-order v. second-order, 73, 174
see also qualified majority voting

Waltz, Kenneth, 186
Washington, George, 56
Webster, Daniel, 120, 126–7, 161, 163

theory of majoritarianism, 127,
161, 185

Weiler, Joseph, 13, 35
welfare state, 156–7, 159
Whig interpretation of history, 49
Whig Party, see United States of

America
White, Hayden, 46
Wilentz, Sean, 136
Wilmot Proviso (1846), 134–5
Wilson, Harold, 89–90, 95
Wilson, Woodrow, 187–8
Wood, Gordon S., 120

Yugoslavia, 48

Zuckert, Michael, 41

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