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TitleTransfer Incentives for High-Performing Teachers
LanguageEnglish
File Size2.5 MB
Total Pages243
Table of Contents
                            ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
DISCLOSURE OF POTENTIAL CONFLICS OF INTEREST
CONTENTS
TABLES
FIGURES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Policy Problem: Unequal Access to High-Performing Teachers
B. One Policy Response: Selective Transfer Incentives
1. Overview of the TTI
2. Logic Model: How Can Teacher-Transfer Incentives Affect Student Achievment?
C. Studying Teacher-Transfer Incentives
1. Research Questions and Study Design
2. Survey Data
3. Administrative Data
II. The Study Sample
A. School Districts
1. How Districts Were Selected
2. Description of the Districts and the Study Context
B. Schools
1. Identifying Potential Sending and Receiving Schools
2. Defining "Participating? Sending and Receiving Schools
C. Students
III. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND PLACEMENT RESULTS
A. How Were the Highest-Performing Teachers Identified and Recruited?
1. Value-Added Analysis to Identify the Highest-Performing Teachers
2. Identifying and Filing Teaching Vacancies
B. How Did Teachers React to the Transfer Incentive?
1. Take-Up Rates
2. Retention of Transfer and Retention-Stipend Teachers Over Two Years
Where Did TTI Transfer Teachers Come From?
Who Filled the Study Vacancies?
1. Control-Group Vacancies
2. Treatment-Group Vacancies
IV. INTERMEDIATE IMPACTS
A. Assignment of Teachers to Students and Grades
1. Assignment of Students to Teachers
2. Assignment of Teachers to Grades
B. Teachers' Mentoring and Leadership Roles
1. Mentoring Received
2. Mentoring Provided and Other Leadership Roles
C. Teacher Attitudes
D. Principal Reports on School Climate and Teacher Contributions
E. Summary of Intermediate Impact Findings
V. IMPACTS ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
A. Data and Methods
B. Impacts in Elementary and Middle Schools
1. Main Findings
2. In Middle School Really Different?
C. Impacts by District
D. Combined Elementary and Middle School Impacts
E. Interpreting the Impact Estimates
1. TTI Impacts Versus Effectiveness of Transfer Teachers
2. Resource-Allocation Effects
VI. Impacts on Teacher Retention
A. Data and Methods
B. Retention Impacts
VII. COST-EFFECTIVENESS
A. Cost-Effectiveness Methods
B. Costs of TTI
C. Cost Comparison
D. Unmeasured Effects of TTI
REFERENCES
APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTERS I AND II
APPENDIX B: VALUE-ADDED ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY HIGHEST-PERFORMING TEACHERS
APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER III
APPENDIX D: IDENTIFICATION OF FOCAL TEACHERS
APPENDIX E: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER IV
APPENDIX F: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER V
APPENDIX G: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER VI
                        
Document Text Contents
Page 1

Transfer Incentives for High-
Performing Teachers: Final Results

from a Multisite Randomized
Experiment



November 2013

U.S. Department of Education

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