Document Text Contents
Page 2
Standing Trial
Page 196
is for these very reasons that the people surveyed consider the
attitude of the local buyer morally reprehensible.
Therefore, the notion of respect turns out to be an eminently
moral category, implying the existence of a moral identity and
an acute sense of justice. The notion of respect is also, in a way,
a legal notion.21 I shall not, however, undertake here the study
of the notion of respect, but rather focus on the strong
connections which exist between the concepts of respect and of
the person. These often go together, as one might speak about
‘respect for the person’. The objective, then, is to examine the
links between the two concepts and to see how they relate to the
sense of justice.
There are, of course, multiple ways to approach that relation-
ship. The main thing is to know what definition to give to the
notions of person and justice.22 Whatever it is, however, ‘it is
particularly important to keep in mind that the conception of the
person is part of a conception of social and political justice’.23
For Rawls, and in spite of the fact that since the time of Kant the
notion of person has occupied a central role in moral philosophy,
the notion has ‘suffered from an excess of ambiguity and in-
accuracy’.24 That is why Rawls offers a clarification based on the
famous ‘original position’, whose purpose is to establish the exact
framework for finding a well-balanced agreement concerning
the principles of justice. According to Rawls, the structure defined
by the ‘original position’ undoubtedly allows an appropriate
conception of the person to crystallise and, with it, the vigorous
identification of the underlying character of the moral, free
and equal personality.25 Thus, he concludes that the ‘original
position’ is not ‘an axiomatical (or deductive) basis from which
principles would derive, but a procedure to select the principles
best adapted to the most wide-spread conception of the person’.26
From this point, the author manages to lay the epistemological
and conceptual foundations indispensable to his theory of justice
as equity which takes into account the person ‘as the basic unit
of action and social responsibility’. It therefore cannot be denied
that an elaborate concept of the person thus forms the basis for
Rawls’s principles of justice.
Without necessarily resorting to a formal definition of the
person, it would not seem devoid of interest to begin, as Maclagan
suggests, with the meaning commonly attributed by the social
185
THE PERSON AND JUSTICE IN A TUNISIAN SOUQ
Page 197
actors to the idea of respect for the person, ‘by reference to
ordinary human beings in respect of their nature as self-conscious
agents’.27 This sense of respect for the person is related to the
individual moral sense and has the further advantage of leading
us directly and skilfully to the question of sense of justice and
injustice. One must not, however, confuse a sense of justice with a
sense of respect for the person, hence our interest in approaching
this study from the point of view of linkages and not in terms of
identification or assimilation. In this respect, one can follow the
argument developed by Maclagan, whose interest lies in clearly
defining the boundaries between justice and respect, all the
while recognising their interrelatedness. He writes:
A rule to the effect that persons as such are to be respected is,
plainly enough, a rule relating to the social aspect of morality. […]
It is a rule of the utmost generality; and if we ask what other
concept of social morality could plausibly claim a similar width of
application the answer must obviously be ‘Justice’. In speaking of
this as a different concept I do not mean that ‘justice’ necessarily
refers to a different ethical fact from that to which ‘respect for
persons’ refers. I mean merely that people who speak both of
justice and of respect for persons do not always, or perhaps even
commonly, treat the two expressions as interchangeable and equi-
valent, mere verbal variants in the way in which ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’
frequently are; and that some who use ‘justice’ language do not
use ‘respect for persons’ language at all – for example, Plato and
Aristotle. Whether ‘justice’ and ‘respect for persons’ do or do not
refer to what is objectively the same thing is precisely one of the
points that has to be determined. In any event, it would seem that,
if there is any sense in talking of a principle of respect for persons
at all, reflection on the concept of justice might provide some clue
to what that principle means.28
On the whole, it appears that the study of the sense of justice
and its social linkages allows us to clarify the question of what
may be called the ethics of respect. Through analysis of the various
argumentative registers and of the forms of justification put forth
by the actors, one enters the sphere of moral values and principles
that express people’s sense of justice or injustice. Marks of respect,
self-esteem, self-respect and respect for others, to name only a
few, revolve around the person as, in Sève’s words, ‘a form-value
equally assigned to each individual in its capacity as member of
STANDING TRIAL
186
Page 392
381
INDEX
Sandel, M. 42–45, 61, 65
Sandwith, F.M. 270
Sanhûrî Pâshâ, ‘Abd al-Razzâq al-
283
Santoro, E. 135, 136, 139
Sarakhsî, S.D. al- 276, 290, 293,
369, 371
Saunders, L.W. 166, 168
Savatier, R. 34, 38
Sâwî, A.S. 344
Sayyeda Aisha 159
Sayyeda Zeinab 159
Schapp, W. 39, 46–49, 61, 65
Schomu’im, Ben 367
Schrader, Abby 112, 113, 115
Schrader, G. 48, 61, 65
Schütz, A. 33, 203, 227, 229
Scorsese, Martin 329
Searle, J.R. 38
Sève, Lucien 62, 65, 186–88, 193,
195
Sha’rawi, al- 132
Shâfi‘ î, al- 94, 268, 271, 278, 290,
293
shakhs, shakhsiyya 58, 60, 240, 292,
322, 370
sharî‘a V, 2, 38, 91–96, 98, 99, 101,
103, 108, 111, 115–17,
119–21, 124–29, 131–37, 139,
260, 267, 270–75, 277, 283,
286, 292, 303, 304, 317, 358,
368, 369, 371
Sharrock, W. 79, 82
Shaykhzâda 112, 115
shaytân, al- 148, 150, 173
Sheikha Nadia 145, 167
Sherif, A.O. 263, 343
Shifa 59
Sidaway vs Board of Governors
Bethlem Royal Hospital 314
Sirhank, Ismâ‘îl 112, 115
Sitz im Leben 26, 27
siyâsa 91–96, 98, 99, 109, 273, 286
Skovgaard-Petersen, J. 130, 136,
139, 314, 317
Smith, W.C. 135, 139
Sohag 254
Soheir 151, 156
Sorbonne University vii
Sosoe, L. 61, 65
Spaemann, R. 183, 192, 195
St Thomas (Aquinas), Thomist 56,
57, 118, 119
Stockinger, P. 32, 38, 227, 229
Stoic(s), Stoicism 14, 55, 118, 119
Strauss, A.L. 35, 38
Suchman, L. 80, 82
Suez crisis (1956) 349
sulh 156, 157
Sultan (‘Umar Bey’s slave) 106, 107
Supreme Constitutional Court
(Egypt) 134, 241, 243, 260,
263, 324, 325, 336, 337, 341
Sura V: the Dinner table 237, 238
Sura VI: The Cattle 238
Sura XI: Hood 237
Sura XIV: Abraham 237
Sura XVII: The Children of Israel
237
Suyûti, J.D. al- 290, 293
ta‘ zîr 99, 101, 102, 237
tahdhib 121
tahkîm al-‘urfî 248
Talal, Asad 89, 113
tamaddun 121, 122, 128
Tantawi, Sayyid 302
Tanzimat 88, 91, 113
Taylor, C. 13, 32, 38, 51, 58, 62, 65
telos 41, 122
Testament, New 367
Testament, Old 367, 369
Teubner, G. 25, 34, 38
tha’ r 248, 251–58
Thai (cultural context)
Thailand 31, 227
The Immigrant (al-Muhâjir) (film)
334
Thévenot, L. 35, 79, 81
Thielmann, Jörn 136, 290, 293, 344
‘three Cs’ (corvée, corruption and
courbash) 86
Page 393
STANDING TRIAL
382
‘ulamâ’ 103
‘Umar Bey Wasfî 106, 107
umma 126
University of Amsterdam vii,
366
University of Liège (Belgium) ix
University of Montreal (Canada)
ix
University of Sfax (Tunisia) ix
Unsal, A. 255, 261, 263
‘Utayfî, J.D. al- 289–91, 293
van de Kerchove, M. 315, 316,
339, 343, 344
Vatin, J.C. 194
Vedel, Georges 337, 339, 344
Vergesellschaftung 119, 123
Veyne, P. 38, 65
Vitta, E. 366, 368, 371
Voltaire 89, 90
Waardenburg, J. 63, 65
walî 277, 280
Waline, M. 28, 34, 38
Walzer, M. 41, 61, 65, 369, 371
Watson, R. 31, 34, 35, 38, 81, 82,
197, 227–29, 315, 317
wazna, waznât 173, 174
Weber, M. 20, 33, 36, 38
wilâya 277, 278
Williams, B. 62, 65, 79, 80, 82,
192, 195
Wittgenstein, L. vii, 40, 227, 230
wujûh al-nâss 103
yafîq 264, 279, 280, 284
Yannakakis, Illios 366, 367, 371
zabtiyya 95
zafâra 156, 157, 158
Zaghlûl, Ahmad Fathî 86, 88,
110–13, 115
zahir 173
zâr see also asyâd 151, 152, 156–58,
164, 167, 168
zawâj 278
Zayd, Professor Abû Nasr Hamîd
334, 336, 337, 341–43
Zeghbib, H. 341, 344
Ziadeh, Farhat 88, 111, 115
Standing Trial
Page 196
is for these very reasons that the people surveyed consider the
attitude of the local buyer morally reprehensible.
Therefore, the notion of respect turns out to be an eminently
moral category, implying the existence of a moral identity and
an acute sense of justice. The notion of respect is also, in a way,
a legal notion.21 I shall not, however, undertake here the study
of the notion of respect, but rather focus on the strong
connections which exist between the concepts of respect and of
the person. These often go together, as one might speak about
‘respect for the person’. The objective, then, is to examine the
links between the two concepts and to see how they relate to the
sense of justice.
There are, of course, multiple ways to approach that relation-
ship. The main thing is to know what definition to give to the
notions of person and justice.22 Whatever it is, however, ‘it is
particularly important to keep in mind that the conception of the
person is part of a conception of social and political justice’.23
For Rawls, and in spite of the fact that since the time of Kant the
notion of person has occupied a central role in moral philosophy,
the notion has ‘suffered from an excess of ambiguity and in-
accuracy’.24 That is why Rawls offers a clarification based on the
famous ‘original position’, whose purpose is to establish the exact
framework for finding a well-balanced agreement concerning
the principles of justice. According to Rawls, the structure defined
by the ‘original position’ undoubtedly allows an appropriate
conception of the person to crystallise and, with it, the vigorous
identification of the underlying character of the moral, free
and equal personality.25 Thus, he concludes that the ‘original
position’ is not ‘an axiomatical (or deductive) basis from which
principles would derive, but a procedure to select the principles
best adapted to the most wide-spread conception of the person’.26
From this point, the author manages to lay the epistemological
and conceptual foundations indispensable to his theory of justice
as equity which takes into account the person ‘as the basic unit
of action and social responsibility’. It therefore cannot be denied
that an elaborate concept of the person thus forms the basis for
Rawls’s principles of justice.
Without necessarily resorting to a formal definition of the
person, it would not seem devoid of interest to begin, as Maclagan
suggests, with the meaning commonly attributed by the social
185
THE PERSON AND JUSTICE IN A TUNISIAN SOUQ
Page 197
actors to the idea of respect for the person, ‘by reference to
ordinary human beings in respect of their nature as self-conscious
agents’.27 This sense of respect for the person is related to the
individual moral sense and has the further advantage of leading
us directly and skilfully to the question of sense of justice and
injustice. One must not, however, confuse a sense of justice with a
sense of respect for the person, hence our interest in approaching
this study from the point of view of linkages and not in terms of
identification or assimilation. In this respect, one can follow the
argument developed by Maclagan, whose interest lies in clearly
defining the boundaries between justice and respect, all the
while recognising their interrelatedness. He writes:
A rule to the effect that persons as such are to be respected is,
plainly enough, a rule relating to the social aspect of morality. […]
It is a rule of the utmost generality; and if we ask what other
concept of social morality could plausibly claim a similar width of
application the answer must obviously be ‘Justice’. In speaking of
this as a different concept I do not mean that ‘justice’ necessarily
refers to a different ethical fact from that to which ‘respect for
persons’ refers. I mean merely that people who speak both of
justice and of respect for persons do not always, or perhaps even
commonly, treat the two expressions as interchangeable and equi-
valent, mere verbal variants in the way in which ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’
frequently are; and that some who use ‘justice’ language do not
use ‘respect for persons’ language at all – for example, Plato and
Aristotle. Whether ‘justice’ and ‘respect for persons’ do or do not
refer to what is objectively the same thing is precisely one of the
points that has to be determined. In any event, it would seem that,
if there is any sense in talking of a principle of respect for persons
at all, reflection on the concept of justice might provide some clue
to what that principle means.28
On the whole, it appears that the study of the sense of justice
and its social linkages allows us to clarify the question of what
may be called the ethics of respect. Through analysis of the various
argumentative registers and of the forms of justification put forth
by the actors, one enters the sphere of moral values and principles
that express people’s sense of justice or injustice. Marks of respect,
self-esteem, self-respect and respect for others, to name only a
few, revolve around the person as, in Sève’s words, ‘a form-value
equally assigned to each individual in its capacity as member of
STANDING TRIAL
186
Page 392
381
INDEX
Sandel, M. 42–45, 61, 65
Sandwith, F.M. 270
Sanhûrî Pâshâ, ‘Abd al-Razzâq al-
283
Santoro, E. 135, 136, 139
Sarakhsî, S.D. al- 276, 290, 293,
369, 371
Saunders, L.W. 166, 168
Savatier, R. 34, 38
Sâwî, A.S. 344
Sayyeda Aisha 159
Sayyeda Zeinab 159
Schapp, W. 39, 46–49, 61, 65
Schomu’im, Ben 367
Schrader, Abby 112, 113, 115
Schrader, G. 48, 61, 65
Schütz, A. 33, 203, 227, 229
Scorsese, Martin 329
Searle, J.R. 38
Sève, Lucien 62, 65, 186–88, 193,
195
Sha’rawi, al- 132
Shâfi‘ î, al- 94, 268, 271, 278, 290,
293
shakhs, shakhsiyya 58, 60, 240, 292,
322, 370
sharî‘a V, 2, 38, 91–96, 98, 99, 101,
103, 108, 111, 115–17,
119–21, 124–29, 131–37, 139,
260, 267, 270–75, 277, 283,
286, 292, 303, 304, 317, 358,
368, 369, 371
Sharrock, W. 79, 82
Shaykhzâda 112, 115
shaytân, al- 148, 150, 173
Sheikha Nadia 145, 167
Sherif, A.O. 263, 343
Shifa 59
Sidaway vs Board of Governors
Bethlem Royal Hospital 314
Sirhank, Ismâ‘îl 112, 115
Sitz im Leben 26, 27
siyâsa 91–96, 98, 99, 109, 273, 286
Skovgaard-Petersen, J. 130, 136,
139, 314, 317
Smith, W.C. 135, 139
Sohag 254
Soheir 151, 156
Sorbonne University vii
Sosoe, L. 61, 65
Spaemann, R. 183, 192, 195
St Thomas (Aquinas), Thomist 56,
57, 118, 119
Stockinger, P. 32, 38, 227, 229
Stoic(s), Stoicism 14, 55, 118, 119
Strauss, A.L. 35, 38
Suchman, L. 80, 82
Suez crisis (1956) 349
sulh 156, 157
Sultan (‘Umar Bey’s slave) 106, 107
Supreme Constitutional Court
(Egypt) 134, 241, 243, 260,
263, 324, 325, 336, 337, 341
Sura V: the Dinner table 237, 238
Sura VI: The Cattle 238
Sura XI: Hood 237
Sura XIV: Abraham 237
Sura XVII: The Children of Israel
237
Suyûti, J.D. al- 290, 293
ta‘ zîr 99, 101, 102, 237
tahdhib 121
tahkîm al-‘urfî 248
Talal, Asad 89, 113
tamaddun 121, 122, 128
Tantawi, Sayyid 302
Tanzimat 88, 91, 113
Taylor, C. 13, 32, 38, 51, 58, 62, 65
telos 41, 122
Testament, New 367
Testament, Old 367, 369
Teubner, G. 25, 34, 38
tha’ r 248, 251–58
Thai (cultural context)
Thailand 31, 227
The Immigrant (al-Muhâjir) (film)
334
Thévenot, L. 35, 79, 81
Thielmann, Jörn 136, 290, 293, 344
‘three Cs’ (corvée, corruption and
courbash) 86
Page 393
STANDING TRIAL
382
‘ulamâ’ 103
‘Umar Bey Wasfî 106, 107
umma 126
University of Amsterdam vii,
366
University of Liège (Belgium) ix
University of Montreal (Canada)
ix
University of Sfax (Tunisia) ix
Unsal, A. 255, 261, 263
‘Utayfî, J.D. al- 289–91, 293
van de Kerchove, M. 315, 316,
339, 343, 344
Vatin, J.C. 194
Vedel, Georges 337, 339, 344
Vergesellschaftung 119, 123
Veyne, P. 38, 65
Vitta, E. 366, 368, 371
Voltaire 89, 90
Waardenburg, J. 63, 65
walî 277, 280
Waline, M. 28, 34, 38
Walzer, M. 41, 61, 65, 369, 371
Watson, R. 31, 34, 35, 38, 81, 82,
197, 227–29, 315, 317
wazna, waznât 173, 174
Weber, M. 20, 33, 36, 38
wilâya 277, 278
Williams, B. 62, 65, 79, 80, 82,
192, 195
Wittgenstein, L. vii, 40, 227, 230
wujûh al-nâss 103
yafîq 264, 279, 280, 284
Yannakakis, Illios 366, 367, 371
zabtiyya 95
zafâra 156, 157, 158
Zaghlûl, Ahmad Fathî 86, 88,
110–13, 115
zahir 173
zâr see also asyâd 151, 152, 156–58,
164, 167, 168
zawâj 278
Zayd, Professor Abû Nasr Hamîd
334, 336, 337, 341–43
Zeghbib, H. 341, 344
Ziadeh, Farhat 88, 111, 115
