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TitleSpain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75
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Total Pages277
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
List of Abbreviations
1 Introduction
2 The Golden Age of Spanish Capitalism: Economic Growth without Political Freedom
3 Tourism and Political Change in Franco’s Spain
4 The Change in Mentalities during the Late Franco Regime
5 How ‘Different’ Was Spain? The Later Franco Regime in International Context
6 Order, Progress, and Syndicalism? How the Francoist Authorities Saw Socio-Economic Change
7 New Political Mentalities in the Tardofranquismo
8 Associations and the Social Origins of the Transition during the Late Franco Regime
9 Cultural Diversity and the Development of a Pre-democratic Civil Society in Spain
10 The Spanish Church: Change and Continuity
11 The Origins of Democratic Support in Post-Franco Spain: Learning to Be a Democrat under Authoritarian Rule?
12 The United States and Spain: From Franco to Juan Carlos
13 The Franco Dictatorship: A Bifurcated Regime?
Notes on Contributors
Document Text Contents
Page 2

Spain Transformed

Page 138

126 New Political Mentalities

aperturistas, it did not provide any real openness in that area. Still, it
introduced the figure of the President of the government (although
Franco did not in effect appoint a President until 1973). The aperturistas
also had hopes of the Law of Family Representation. The approval
of this Law brought to the Cortes a large number of deputies of the
family sector, or procuradores familiares, of the ‘generation of Prince
Juan Carlos’.19 This new breed of moderate Francoists, although fully
integrated into the regime, was to play a decisive role in the success
of the transition to a democratic system (among them Alfonso Osorio,
Marcelino Oreja, and Adolfo Suárez). 20 A group of around 60 famil-
iares decided to organize their meetings outside Madrid, earning the
nickname of ‘the wandering Cortes’. 21 However, following several meet-
ings, the Spanish political authorities stopped them. As a group, the
familiares may not have exerted much influence upon the regime, but
they achieved something of lasting importance. The press wrote about
them, and it was through this publicity that people became aware of
the existence of a progressive current within the regime, one willing to
modernize the political system.

The aperturistas also saw potential for reform in the area of political
representation in the Organic Law of the Movement. According to this
Law, the Movement had the function of ‘channelling the contrast of
opinions within its Principles’. But the National Council still had to
approve a statute and an additional law in order to legalize political
associations. In the end, it took the Council two years to approve the
ambiguous ‘associations of public opinion’. The growing impatience
of some members of the regime was such that, while still waiting for
Franco’s ratification of the Law, they began the formation of associ-
ations.22 In total, five associations were created. Ironically, however,
after all this trouble, the Caudillo did not ratify the law.

The summer of 1969 witnessed two incidents that momentarily
diverted the attention of the political class from the issue of associations.
The first one was the appointment of Prince Juan Carlos as Franco’s
successor to the position of Head of State with the title of King. The
second one was the exposure of a financial scandal by the company
Matesa, in which various ministers – linked with the Catholic organ-
ization Opus Dei – were tainted. The scandal, which led to a cabinet
crisis, reflected the acute divisions within the regime. As a result of the
crisis Manuel Fraga was dismissed from the Ministry of Tourism and

In the autumn of 1969, the Minister Secretary-General of the Move-
ment, Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, took up the issue of the associations

Page 139

Cristina Palomares 127

again by proposing to replace the old ‘Delegation of Associations’ with
one for the ‘Family, Political Action and Participation’. The proposal
would be presented to Congress on 15 December 1969. That day, four
national councillors made speeches in reply to Fernández-Miranda’s
proposal. One of them was Manuel Fraga, who, although he was already
out of the government, remained as a procurador in the Cortes. His
speech clearly reflected the concerns of the reformist sector formed
by many young people who supported his idea of modernizing the
regime. However, Fraga upset the Caudillo, who regarded his speech
as disloyal. Once again, however, discrepancies between Admiral Luis
Carrero Blanco (Franco’s right-hand man) and Fernández-Miranda, as
well as the Caudillo’s reluctance to accept any reform, led to a complete
halt in the development of political associations. It seemed unbelievable
that the government had managed to freeze the issue before such an
expectant, and already restless, public. Articles and interviews with polit-
ical personalities could not avoid the issue, and even Prince Juan Carlos
was said to believe that the introduction of a network of associations
would ease the transition to a post-Francoist Spain. Also, at the time, an
important number of the Spanish clergy were becoming more and more
critical of the regime and demanded, among other things, freedom of
expression and political association. They were seconded by students
and other sectors of civil society. The number of members of the regime
aware of the divorce between the regime and the general public was
also increasing considerably. The political evolution of the regime was
clearly being outpaced by the socio-economic evolution of society, and
this imbalance was destined to become a serious problem. By the early
1970s, people started to organize ‘political dinners’ as temporary substi-
tutes for political associations, where people could meet informally to
discuss political issues. These ‘political dinners’ attracted personalities
from both the clandestine democratic opposition and regime reformists,
becoming very fashionable, at least in Madrid.

Meanwhile, the Prince had privately shown interest in the possibility
of reforming the Francoist Fundamental Laws, despite having sworn
loyalty to the Laws in 1969. Moreover, since his appointment as Franco’s
successor, the Prince had been widening his circle of visitors to the
Zarzuela Palace in an attempt to prise himself out of his political isol-
ation. Among his new visitors, Juan Carlos included a range of figures
from the regime as well as a number of independents, some foreign
journalists, and even somemembers of the moderate opposition. Gradu-
ally, he was gaining the support of the reformists. But the Prince had no
support from the orthodox supporters of the regime and even less from

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264 Index

students, 92, 110, 111
and changing mentalities, 77–9
and Marxism, 78
revolt of 1956, 3, 77, 168–9, 171
see also opposition; repression

Suárez, Adolfo, 17, 130, 131, 132, 133,
134, 201, 242–3

Suárez Illana, Adolfo, 131–2
Superior Council of Scientific Research

(CSIC) (Consejo Superior de
Investigaciónes Científicas), 123

Tácito group, 128–9, 132
Testimonio de las generaciones ajenas a

la guerra civil, 77
Thompson, E.P., 20
Torcal, Mariano, 23, 24
tourism, 13–14

conflict over within Franco regime,
48–9, 52, 53–4, 55–62

economic impact of, 54–9
and Foreign Ministry, 52, 53
government policy, 53–8, 59, 61
interpretations of, 47–8
mass tourism, 51, 52–4, 55
and Ministry of Industry, 53
moral censure of, 52, 54, 60
numbers of tourists, 53, 55, 59, 85
pre-Franco development, 49–50,

58–9, 60–2
of Spaniards, 59
and Spanish identity, 49–50, 53, 54,

56–7, 62
see also economy; ‘Spain is

Different’ (slogan); Stabilization
Plan (1959)

trade unions, see Vertical Syndicates
(Sindicatos Verticales); Workers’
Commissions (Comisiones
Obreras) (CC.OO.)

Transition, The, 1–2, 10, 17, 18, 20,
23–4, 115, 135, 140, 253

and democratic opinion, 23–4
interpretations of, 25, 140–1, 163
and modernization, 195
social history of, 20, 158
and ‘third wave’, 227
transitologists, 20, 141

see also Borbón y Borbón, Juan
Carlos de; Huntingdon, Samuel
P.; Suárez, Adolfo

Triunfo, 175
Tuñón de Lara, Manuel, 6
Tusell, Javier, 5

Umbral, Francisco, 173–4
Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD)

(Union of the Democratic
Centre), 134, 200–1, 215

United Nations, 2, 3, 5, 51
United States of America

attitude to opposition, 229, 231–2,
236, 237–8, 242

attitude to PCE, 238, 242
and Bases Agreement (1953), 23
and democratization of Spain, 22,

diplomats in Madrid, 229, 231–2
and European economy, 38–40
policy towards Franco Spain, 228–34
policy towards post-Franco Spain,

pressures Franco on Transition,

and Treaty of Friendship (1976), 240
see also Areilza, José María; Bases

Agreement with US (1953);
Borbón y Borbón, Juan Carlos
de; Kissinger, Henry; State
Department (US)

Vance, Cyrus, 242
Vertical Syndicates (Sindicatos

Verticales), 92–3
attitude of regime to, 102, 103–4,

105, 106
and labour unrest, 92–3
regulation of, 38

Villoria, Enrique, 151
Vizcaya, 113
Vovelle, Michel, 70

Walters, Vernon, 230
welfare state, 41
West Germany, 88

see also Allardt, Helmut; Brandt,

Page 277

Index 265

Western Europe, 22
post-war boom, 38–40
Spain compared to, 16–17, 40–1
Spain’s convergence with, 12,

13–14, 56, 59, 62, 80, 85–7, 98
Spain’s divergence from, 12–13
see also economy; Europe; Franco

regime; ‘Spain is Different’
(slogan); tourism

Workers’ Commissions (Comisiones
Obreras) (CC.OO.), 3, 93, 108,
114, 145, 146

see also civil governors; opposition;

World War II, see Second World War

Ysàs, Pere, 77, 169
Yugoslavia, 92, 95

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