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Page 1
May 2010
The Global Maritime Security
and the Japan‐U.S. Alliance
Report of the Study Project
Challenges and Prospects of Japan‐U.S.
Cooperation in Non‐Traditional Security:
Focusing on Anti‐Piracy Cooperation
Published by
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Supported by
The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)
Page 2
Table of Contents
Preface..………….……………………………………………………………………………………1
Executive Summary.…………………………………………………………………………………3
Part I: Promoting Japan‐U.S. Cooperation
Chapter 1 The Establishment of U.S.‐Japan Comprehensive Approaches to Counter‐Piracy……………...7
Chapter 2 Safety and Security in the Malacca Straits: The Limits of Collaboration…………………………18
Part II: Lessons and Challenges of Counter Piracy
Chapter 3 The Challenge of the Jolly Roger: Industry Perspectives on Piracy………………………………39
Chapter 4 Dangerous Sea Areas Where Many Cases of Piracy Take Place…………………………………...54
Chapter 5 Japan’s Role in Strengthening Maritime Security in Southeast Asia………………………………63
Part III: Counter Piracy and the Japan‐U. S. Alliance
Chapter 6 Japan’s Counter‐Piracy Policy and The U.S.‐Japan Partnership……………………………………77
Chapter 7 United States Strategic Interests and Cooperative Activities in Maritime Southeast Asia………85
Chapter 8 Fusing U.S’s New Maritime Strategy & Japan’s Maritime Defense Strategy…………………….103
Appendix
Contributors………..………….……………………………………………………………………………………120
Secretariat………..………….………………………………………………………………………………………122
Introduction to JFIR……………………………………………………………………………………………...123
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61
Though it has not been reported in Japan as no ship associated with Japan has been attacked, the most
dangerous type of piracy, including robbery at sea, kidnapping and shooting, is committed off Nigeria.
Pirates attack ships and take money and goods by force from time to time in the Gerasa Strait of
Indonesia and near the Anambas Islands in the South China Sea. In Peru and Brazil in South America
and in Bangladesh in South Asia, many sneak thief–type pirates creep onto mooring ships and commit
theft.
Threat of Terrorism at Sea
It is difficult to tell terrorism at sea from piracy. Since 2001, typical groups of pirates in the Strait of
Malacca combined with anti‐government organizations and groups of terrorists, thereby integrating
piracy and terrorism at sea into a new type of marine crime. In June 2001, a spokesman for the Free
Aceh Movement, an Indonesian anti‐government organization, declared that ships sailing through the
Strait of Malacca should obtain permission from the Free Aceh Movement, which attacked small
tankers. Thus the number of cases of piracy by anti‐government organizations increased in the Strait of
Malacca from 2001 to 2004. Pirates cooperating with anti‐government organizations are armed with
machine guns and rifles, they attack small tankers, tag boats and fishing boats, and they abduct sailors
and demand ransoms. The appearance of such pirates has called for countermeasures that span
borders.
On October 6, 2002, Islamic terrorists charged a small boat at a big French tanker called
Limbourg (158,000 gross tons), and blew up their own boat off Yemen in the Gulf of Aden. Since many
countries have only poor capacities for patrolling their coasts in Asia and Africa in particular, terrorists’
intrusion from the sea and acts of terrorism along coasts are feared. It was found that offenders
involved in the terrorist explosions in Mumbai in India in November 2008 entered via the sea. It was
also found that North Korean agents entered Japan from the sea and committed unlawful acts
including abductions. Singapore has been strengthening its sea patrols as it is worried that terrorists
may destroy oil refinery plants in the port. It is alerting ships carrying dangerous substances such as
LNG tankers. Though the coastal zones of Asian countries have taken few measures against terrorism
at sea so far, more and more Asian ports are going on the alert in the same way as Singapore.
Training for patrolling at sea and for catching ships carrying weapons of mass destruction
are carried out in order to prevent acts of terrorism at sea: this is the joint training for Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) that was started in 2003 at the U.S.’s proposal. PSI is a framework for
cooperation among countries around the world to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles, and products related thereto from states sponsoring terrorism. More than 60
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62
countries have joined this framework, with 15 countries including Japan, the U.S., the UK and Russia
being core members. In August 2005, joint training was held off Singapore in which vessels of the Japan
Coast Guard and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force participated.
While the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea has international provisions on
piracy, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(“SUAConvention”) has provisions on how to deal with terrorism at sea and piracy.
The SUA Convention was adopted in 1988 following the incident of the Achille Lauro, an
Italian cruise ship that was hijacked by Palestine guerillas in the Mediterranean Sea in 1985. Japan
acceded to this convention in 1998. In this case, the offenders demanded the release of their comrades
and one U.S. passenger was killed. Thereafter the SUA Convention was adopted, led by the United
States. It stipulates that countries other than coastal states may also control serious crimes such as
piracy and acts of terrorism at sea that involve the territorial waters of two countries or more. There are,
however, only a small number of countries that have ratified the SUA Convention as many consider it
to violate their jurisdiction.
Areas off Yemen, along the coast of Sri Lanka, off the southern Philippines and along the
coast of Bali are considered to be at danger from terrorism at sea in Asia.
There are marine areas other than the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and off Somalia where caution
is needed. One is along the coast of Sri Lanka, where acts of terrorism at sea were committed by
Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam, an anti government organization of Sri Lanka. In 2007, a speedboat
carrying a bomb rushed into the port in Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka. This organization is also
known to practice piracy. Similarly, Abu Sayyaf is an anti government organization that commits acts of
terrorism at sea and piracy in the south of the Philippines. Acts of terrorism at sea and attacks on ships
are also likely by Islamic extremists in the south of Thailand and in the sea near Bali, Indonesia.
Countries around the world are calling for strengthened patrols at sea, led by the IMO, but
the seas of the world are too wide to take care of in reality. Somali piracy has made us realize the limits
of patrolling the sea. We need to strengthen new systems for patrols at sea, including ships’ self defense
measures from now on. Japan also needs to consider establishing cooperative systems between the
Japan Maritime Self Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard, overcoming their sectionalism,
including legal systems.
Page 126
Copy Inhibit
Page 127
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
Akasaka 2‐17‐12‐1301, Minato‐ku, Tokyo 107‐0052, Japan
Tel: +81‐3‐3584‐2190 Fax: +81‐3‐3584‐2190
E‐Mail: [email protected] URL: http://www.jfir.or.jp
JF-J-Ⅲ-A-0023
May 2010
The Global Maritime Security
and the Japan‐U.S. Alliance
Report of the Study Project
Challenges and Prospects of Japan‐U.S.
Cooperation in Non‐Traditional Security:
Focusing on Anti‐Piracy Cooperation
Published by
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Supported by
The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)
Page 2
Table of Contents
Preface..………….……………………………………………………………………………………1
Executive Summary.…………………………………………………………………………………3
Part I: Promoting Japan‐U.S. Cooperation
Chapter 1 The Establishment of U.S.‐Japan Comprehensive Approaches to Counter‐Piracy……………...7
Chapter 2 Safety and Security in the Malacca Straits: The Limits of Collaboration…………………………18
Part II: Lessons and Challenges of Counter Piracy
Chapter 3 The Challenge of the Jolly Roger: Industry Perspectives on Piracy………………………………39
Chapter 4 Dangerous Sea Areas Where Many Cases of Piracy Take Place…………………………………...54
Chapter 5 Japan’s Role in Strengthening Maritime Security in Southeast Asia………………………………63
Part III: Counter Piracy and the Japan‐U. S. Alliance
Chapter 6 Japan’s Counter‐Piracy Policy and The U.S.‐Japan Partnership……………………………………77
Chapter 7 United States Strategic Interests and Cooperative Activities in Maritime Southeast Asia………85
Chapter 8 Fusing U.S’s New Maritime Strategy & Japan’s Maritime Defense Strategy…………………….103
Appendix
Contributors………..………….……………………………………………………………………………………120
Secretariat………..………….………………………………………………………………………………………122
Introduction to JFIR……………………………………………………………………………………………...123
Page 63
61
Though it has not been reported in Japan as no ship associated with Japan has been attacked, the most
dangerous type of piracy, including robbery at sea, kidnapping and shooting, is committed off Nigeria.
Pirates attack ships and take money and goods by force from time to time in the Gerasa Strait of
Indonesia and near the Anambas Islands in the South China Sea. In Peru and Brazil in South America
and in Bangladesh in South Asia, many sneak thief–type pirates creep onto mooring ships and commit
theft.
Threat of Terrorism at Sea
It is difficult to tell terrorism at sea from piracy. Since 2001, typical groups of pirates in the Strait of
Malacca combined with anti‐government organizations and groups of terrorists, thereby integrating
piracy and terrorism at sea into a new type of marine crime. In June 2001, a spokesman for the Free
Aceh Movement, an Indonesian anti‐government organization, declared that ships sailing through the
Strait of Malacca should obtain permission from the Free Aceh Movement, which attacked small
tankers. Thus the number of cases of piracy by anti‐government organizations increased in the Strait of
Malacca from 2001 to 2004. Pirates cooperating with anti‐government organizations are armed with
machine guns and rifles, they attack small tankers, tag boats and fishing boats, and they abduct sailors
and demand ransoms. The appearance of such pirates has called for countermeasures that span
borders.
On October 6, 2002, Islamic terrorists charged a small boat at a big French tanker called
Limbourg (158,000 gross tons), and blew up their own boat off Yemen in the Gulf of Aden. Since many
countries have only poor capacities for patrolling their coasts in Asia and Africa in particular, terrorists’
intrusion from the sea and acts of terrorism along coasts are feared. It was found that offenders
involved in the terrorist explosions in Mumbai in India in November 2008 entered via the sea. It was
also found that North Korean agents entered Japan from the sea and committed unlawful acts
including abductions. Singapore has been strengthening its sea patrols as it is worried that terrorists
may destroy oil refinery plants in the port. It is alerting ships carrying dangerous substances such as
LNG tankers. Though the coastal zones of Asian countries have taken few measures against terrorism
at sea so far, more and more Asian ports are going on the alert in the same way as Singapore.
Training for patrolling at sea and for catching ships carrying weapons of mass destruction
are carried out in order to prevent acts of terrorism at sea: this is the joint training for Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) that was started in 2003 at the U.S.’s proposal. PSI is a framework for
cooperation among countries around the world to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles, and products related thereto from states sponsoring terrorism. More than 60
Page 64
62
countries have joined this framework, with 15 countries including Japan, the U.S., the UK and Russia
being core members. In August 2005, joint training was held off Singapore in which vessels of the Japan
Coast Guard and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force participated.
While the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea has international provisions on
piracy, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(“SUAConvention”) has provisions on how to deal with terrorism at sea and piracy.
The SUA Convention was adopted in 1988 following the incident of the Achille Lauro, an
Italian cruise ship that was hijacked by Palestine guerillas in the Mediterranean Sea in 1985. Japan
acceded to this convention in 1998. In this case, the offenders demanded the release of their comrades
and one U.S. passenger was killed. Thereafter the SUA Convention was adopted, led by the United
States. It stipulates that countries other than coastal states may also control serious crimes such as
piracy and acts of terrorism at sea that involve the territorial waters of two countries or more. There are,
however, only a small number of countries that have ratified the SUA Convention as many consider it
to violate their jurisdiction.
Areas off Yemen, along the coast of Sri Lanka, off the southern Philippines and along the
coast of Bali are considered to be at danger from terrorism at sea in Asia.
There are marine areas other than the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and off Somalia where caution
is needed. One is along the coast of Sri Lanka, where acts of terrorism at sea were committed by
Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam, an anti government organization of Sri Lanka. In 2007, a speedboat
carrying a bomb rushed into the port in Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka. This organization is also
known to practice piracy. Similarly, Abu Sayyaf is an anti government organization that commits acts of
terrorism at sea and piracy in the south of the Philippines. Acts of terrorism at sea and attacks on ships
are also likely by Islamic extremists in the south of Thailand and in the sea near Bali, Indonesia.
Countries around the world are calling for strengthened patrols at sea, led by the IMO, but
the seas of the world are too wide to take care of in reality. Somali piracy has made us realize the limits
of patrolling the sea. We need to strengthen new systems for patrols at sea, including ships’ self defense
measures from now on. Japan also needs to consider establishing cooperative systems between the
Japan Maritime Self Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard, overcoming their sectionalism,
including legal systems.
Page 126
Copy Inhibit
Page 127
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
Akasaka 2‐17‐12‐1301, Minato‐ku, Tokyo 107‐0052, Japan
Tel: +81‐3‐3584‐2190 Fax: +81‐3‐3584‐2190
E‐Mail: [email protected] URL: http://www.jfir.or.jp
JF-J-Ⅲ-A-0023
