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TitleReassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs: Transformation, Evolution and Lessons Learnt
Author
LanguageEnglish
File Size817.0 KB
Total Pages192
Table of Contents
                            Half-Title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Notes on Contributors
Introduction: Reflecting on the Global Impact of the RMA
1 The United States and the RMA: Revolutions Do Not Revolutionize Everything
2 A Peculiarly British Revolution: Missing the Point or Just Avoiding Change?
3 The Perpetual Search for Efficiency: The Canadian Approach to the RMA and Military Transformation
4 The Interruption and Evolution of Australia’s RMA
5 The Israeli Revolution in Military Affairs and the Road to the 2006 Lebanon War
6 The Russian Response to the RMA: Military Strategy towards Modern Security Threats
7 RMA and India: Nothing Revolutionary about It
8 RMA, European Militaries and the Limits of Modernization
Conclusion: Reflecting on the RMA Concept
Index
                        
Document Text Contents
Page 2

Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs

Page 96

The Interruption and Evolution of Australia’s RMA 85

luck. Officially, there was still a major lack of coordination at the highest
military levels when it came time to actually deploying. If it hadn’t been
for the unauthorized advanced contingency planning, the ADF would
have had mere weeks to prepare for the deployment. Likewise, if orders
to carry only the bare essentials hadn’t been given prior to the deploy-
ment of the first troops to Timor-Leste they would have run out of food,
water, and ammunition before the first ship arrived 24-hours later.
The force sustainment initiatives in Timor-Leste benefitted greatly from
the necessary supply chain management changes to support Bel Isi,
and the entire mission was facilitated by the rapid-deployment notice
that the 3rd Brigade had been put on to possibly support Bel Isi. 61 At
the conclusion of Operation Warden these luck factors were called the
successful application of lessons learned, but the true test of that would
be the long deployment of ADF troops to Afghanistan in 2003.

Where is the “joint” discussion in Afghanistan?

As a contributor to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan, Australia had ample opportunity to demonstrate and
improve upon its force projection and sustainment abilities during its
conventional force commitment as part of Operation Slipper. Despite
shifting mission priorities, a change from stabilization to reconstruc-
tion, and caveats placed on the ADF and its Rules of Engagement (ROEs)
by Parliament, 62 this mission was considered a success militarily.

As the ISAF mission expanded out of Kabul, Australia took responsi-
bility for the southern province of Uruzgan in 2006. Securing and recon-
structing Uruzgan, a poor province with a flourishing narcotics base and
a strong Taliban foothold, was seen as an ambitious undertaking for
the ADF. 63 Though primarily an Army deployment, Operation Slipper
was supported by joint commands in personnel and logistics, intelli-
gence, operations, planning, and communications and information
systems. 64 At its height there were 1550 personnel deployed in Uruzgan,
not including Special Forces Task Groups, and two CH-47 Chinook heli-
copters, three C-130 Hercules, two AP-3C Orion supply and surveillance
planes, and a C-17 Globemaster strategic airlift aircraft, all of which were
providing tactical lift, resupply, and close air support. 65

Despite the impressive joint effort made in Afghanistan, and the insti-
tutional emphasis on jointness leading up to the deployment, discus-
sions of it are conspicuously lacking from post-engagement analyzes and
lessons learned. These lessons are still being formulated at the NATO and
individual state levels, but those emanating from Australia are focused

Page 97

86 Rachael Bryson

on the application of COIN doctrine and combat experience. 66 Even
more concerning is the growing number of voices warning of the aver-
sion to integrating these lessons into future training and education. 67

Today, Australian discussions of jointness coincide with those of
military professionalism and education. A 2010 special edition of the
Australian Defence Force Journal credits the shift in professional mili-
tary education that began in the 1990s for engendering the concept of
jointness into all areas of the military profession. 68 Rear Admiral James
Goldrick, Commander at the Joint Education, Training and Warfare
Command emphasizes that successful jointness does not come at the
expense of the individual services, but rather by ensuring that officers
are educated “not only in formal skills and knowledge but [are] in posses-
sion of the right outlook and that these parallel requirements exist at
every stage of continuum.” 69 Professionalism in their given trade and
within their given service is to be valued above all else as this training
should coincide with the skills to successfully employ jointness.

The outwardly successful pursuit of jointness has afforded the ADF the
ability to be as mobile and versatile as the original RMA ambition had
planned. While far from the perfect picture painted by the Australian
Defence Force Journal, Australia has excelled – and continues to seek
ways to improve – on jointness, making them a possible model for other
middle powers. As some authors caution, however, the ADF must be
careful not to revert back to pre-Timor-Leste/Afghanistan training and
doctrine under the pressures of defense austerity. 70

The current state of affairs

In February 2013 an article criticized the Gillard government’s $5.4
billion budget cuts to defense for “deferring or cancelling key weapons
modernization programs in the process,” and risking the interoper-
ability with the US that Australia so values by raising concerns that “the
cuts would harm Australia’s ability to support the US pivot to Asia in the
short to medium term.” 71 This is a far cry from the ambitious tone of
defense planning in Australia in the mid-to-late 1990s and once again
demonstrated the devastating impact of changeable and unreliable
defense funding. Objectively, however, this outcome is not surprising
given the trajectory of the past fifteen years for the ADF.

The international security environment can change in an instant and
is highly sensitive to exogenous shocks. While many of these shocks
require immediate reaction, militaries are not often equipped for such
rapid change. As with other large institutions with many moving parts,

Page 191

181

Afghanistan, 7, 9–12, 16, 22, 30,
33, 45–46, 51–52, 59, 62, 64, 71,
76–77, 79, 80, 85–86, 87, 102,
113, 115, 125–126, 127, 134,
142, 159–160, 164, 166, 167–168,
169–170, 171, 172, 179

Air-Land battle, 3, 18, 20, 21, 23
Al-Qaeda, 7, 59
Australia, 10, 11, 71–88, 176, 177
Australian Defence Force (ADF), 10,

11, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,
80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87

Bagnall, Sir Nigel, 35–36, 37, 38, 39,
40–41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 177

Brom, Shlomo, 94, 96, 98, 177

Canada, 51–66, 84, 176, 177
Canadian Forces (CF), 4, 10, 51, 52,

53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62,
63, 64, 65, 66

China, 12, 73, 87, 112–113, 124, 126,
127, 133, 135, 137–138, 139, 140,
149

Clausewitz, Carol von, 5, 7, 30, 179
COIN (counter-insurgency), 77, 86,

87, 163–164, 168, 172
Cold Start doctrine, 144, 148
cyber, 139, 178

deterrence, 53, 94, 100, 112, 122,
123–124, 126, 136–137, 144,
170, 176

effects-based operations (EBO), 8,
144, 145, 147, 160, 176

France, 53, 84, 140, 159, 160, 161, 169

Georgia, 113, 121, 125
Gerasimov, Valeriy, 117, 124,

125–126

Germany, 34, 35–36, 37, 38, 41, 42,
44, 53, 55, 157, 159–160, 163, 168,
169, 172

Gulf War (1991), 2, 3, 4, 5–7, 8, 9,
10, 19, 22, 23, 34, 41, 44, 45, 71,
73, 93, 95, 96, 97, 102, 107, 112,
113, 118, 119, 133, 134, 142, 175,
177, 179

Hezbollah, 8, 11, 93, 96–99, 101, 102,
103, 104, 105, 107, 108

Hillier, Rick, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64,
65, 177

Hussein, Saddam, 1, 22, 23
hybrid warfare, 87, 113, 123, 176

India, 12, 13, 132–151, 176
Iraq, 1, 6, 7, 8, 16, 19, 22–23, 24, 25,

26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 45, 46, 54,
59, 76, 77, 87, 95, 96, 102, 115,
127, 134, 159, 160, 163, 164, 166,
167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 179

Israel, 6, 8, 11, 35, 92–108, 115, 141,
176, 177, 178

Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), 11, 92,
93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108

Kargil War (1999), 136, 137, 138–142,
145, 146, 149, 150

Knowledge Edge, 11, 71, 75, 79
Kosovo, 9, 11, 22, 30, 102–103, 107,

134, 159

Lebanon, 1, 8, 11, 92–94, 96–99, 102,
103–105, 106

Libya, 1, 66, 115, 125, 160, 179
Limited Conflict Doctrine (LCD), 11,

93, 99–103, 105, 107
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), 9, 11,

12, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108, 115,
126, 135

Index

Note: The use of bold in the index page numbers represents a chapter on that topic

Page 192

182 Index

Marshall, Andrew, 4, 5, 11, 17–18, 24,
29, 38, 177

Military Technical Revolution (MTR),
3, 4, 11, 112, 175

military transformation, 7–8, 16, 60,
102, 113, 156, 159, 165

NATO, 3, 9, 12–13, 18, 34, 35–37,
38–41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, 53,
55, 56, 57, 59, 76, 85, 87, 112, 113,
115–116, 117, 118–120, 125, 126,
127, 160, 164, 166–167, 170, 171,
172, 176

network centric warfare, 12, 77, 160,
163–164, 172

nuclear weapons, 3, 12, 13, 17,
35–37, 41, 43, 45, 112, 116,
117–120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126,
133, 135–139, 140, 143, 144, 145,
147, 149, 158, 176

offset strategy, 3
Ogarkov, Nikolai, 3, 177
Operation Allied Force, 57
Operation Desert Storm, 1, 4, 16,

22–25, 29, 52, 71, 74, 87, 175
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 22, 23, 26,

28, 29, 59, 159
Operation Parakram, 136, 137, 139,

143, 144

precision guided munitions, 3, 6,
8, 57, 77, 93, 94, 112, 115, 116,
121–122, 123, 126, 127, 134, 136

prompt global strike, 57, 116, 117,
122, 126, 178

Rumsfeld, Donald, 8, 16, 60,
102

Russia, 5, 12, 21, 87, 112–131, 133,
140, 141, 157, 160, 176

shock and awe, 12, 18, 23, 145
Solomon Islands, 11, 71, 74, 76
Soviet Union, 3, 4, 17–21, 26, 29,

35–37, 39–41, 44, 45, 53, 95, 112,
113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 122, 127,
135, 157, 158–160, 169, 172, 175,
177

Timor-Leste, 11, 71, 74, 76, 82,
83–85, 86

UAV, 19, 27, 75, 79, 87, 95, 98, 122,
123, 141, 148

Ukraine, 1, 12, 112, 113, 115, 127,
179

United Kingdom (UK), 6, 33–50, 53,
73, 159, 160, 161, 163, 167, 168,
169, 176, 177

United States (US), 3–4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
16–32, 44, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59, 71,
73, 112, 132, 157, 158, 160, 175,
177

Vietnam War, 3, 6, 17, 73, 81, 94,
158, 163, 177

Winograd Commission, 92, 105,
106

Yugoslavia, 13, 58, 116, 120, 125,
157, 158, 159, 160, 166

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