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Duff _ Virtues for the People
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bibliography 339

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���%�� ��� &’(��� "�)
��� %�&#���
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340 bibliography

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abstracts 383

competition, but pragmatically he recognises its usefulness when directed towards
what is just and profitable for the state, as in Aristides’ case. Therefore he regularly
praises his protagonists’ self-control in managing their philonikia, and urges it for
his contemporaries.

�. ‘Popular philosophy’ in context
A. Pérez Jiménez, Astrometeorología y creencias sobre los astros

en Plutarco
This contribution shows that Plutarch, who was highly interested in contemporary
religious and scientific issues, was familiar with certain popular beliefs about the
stars. This concern is evident in the titles of some lost works, in some Table
Talks of which only the titles remain, and in several passages of the Lives where
Plutarch echoes the activity of the astrologers. In this contribution I pay attention
to Plutarch’s beliefs on astral mysticism as they appear in De Iside, as well as to
his interpretation of astrometeorological phenomena concerning the behaviour of
animals and plants under the influence of the sun and moon. Sufficient information
about this theme can be found in the above mentioned De Iside, in the Comment
on Hesiod’s Works and Days, and in the Table Talks. A closer analysis also shows
that Plutarch’s beliefs concerning this influence are in line with other literary testi-
monies of Imperial times and, in particular, with some prescriptions in astrological
lunar calendars of late antiquity.

J. Mossman – F. Titchener, Bitch is not a four-letter word. Animal
reason and human passion in Plutarch
It is no surprise to the authors that a humane, compassionate, tolerant, and wise human
like Plutarch wrote several essays specifically about animals, notably Terrestriane an
aquatilia animalia sint callidiora (De sollertia animalium), Bruta animalia ratione
uti, and De esu carnium orationes ii. These essays were used by philosophers in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as early evidence of the so-called ‘theriophilic
paradox, the notion that while the human being occupies a higher rung in the
universal hierarchy than the beast, as indicated by human power over the animal
world, human behaviour justifies the claim that human morality is on a lower level
than that of the beasts’. In modern times, classical scholarship has tended to use
these essays as ammunition for an animal rights movement, which of course can
be seen as an extension of the Enlightenment interest in theriophily.

Yet although these ‘animal’ essays are grouped with Plutarch’s other ‘scientific’
essays in Loeb vol. xii (De facie, De primo frigido, Aquane an ignis sit utilior), our
interest in Plutarch’s animals is not particularly scientific – rather, we are focusing
on rhetoric. We hope that analysis of De sollertia animalium (and, to a lesser extent,
Bruta animalia ratione uti) will provide insight into Plutarch’s own attitudes about
virtues, arguing that the use of animals provides a kind of surrogacy or a place
for Plutarch to argue his points at a safe remove. We also hope to show that there
is more to these charming dialogues in terms of rhetorical skill and subtlety than
may immediately be apparent, or has traditionally been assumed.

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F. F������, Autour du miroir. Les miroitements d’une image dans
l’œuvre de Plutarque
This paper aims at an exhaustive reconsideration of the simile of the mirror in
Plutarch’s works. Generally speaking, the comparison enables drawing nearer some-
thing that is far away (e.g., knowledge or virtue) and shows what deserves to be
sought or imitated. More precisely, the vast range of uses of this ‘mirror’ may be
classified under two headings, ontology (with its epistemological sequel) and ethics.
In the epistemological field, the mirror imagery appears in relation to mathematics –
especially geometry – and reminds us of the necessity for human knowledge to
lean on sensible images that only reflect intelligible beings and may be deceptive
as well as initiatory, as is shown by the ambiguous action of the sun. In the ethical
field, Plutarch insists on self-knowledge and emulation of the glorious models of
the past, but he also takes into account the demands of particular circumstances.
In everyday life friends can contribute to moral improvement, but Plutarch does
not use the simile of the mirror for them – as the Stoics, Seneca, or Epictetus do
for the philosophers. Instead, only wives or flatterers are called ‘mirrors’, denoting
either conjugal harmony or contemptible servility. The analysis finally raises the
(still open) question of the respective roles which interiority and the example of
other people have in moral life.

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