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TitleNaturalism and the First-Person Perspective
Author
LanguageEnglish
File Size2.2 MB
Total Pages273
Table of Contents
                            CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Part  I THE CORE ARGUMENT
	1 Varieties of Naturalism
	2 On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective
	3 Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
	4 Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
	5 Arguments against First-Person Naturalization
Part II AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
	6 From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective
	7 Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?
	8 A Metaphysical Framework for the First-Person Perspective
	9 Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility
	10 Natural Reality
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
                        
Document Text Contents
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N AT U R A L I SM A N D T H E F I R ST-PE R SON

PE R S PECT I V E

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that Jones is wealthy”; not realizing that he* is Jones,
he dissents at t� from “I believe that I* am wealthy.” In
these circumstances at t�, (ii) is true and (i) is false. 9

Now suppose that farmhand Jones wins the state lot-
tery; so Jones comes to believe at t″ that he* is wealthy;
at about the same time (at t″), he reads that, due to
mismanagement, the missing Jones’s hedge fund has
collapsed, and that Jones is a pauper. So he comes to
disbelieve at t″ that Jones is wealthy. In these later cir-
cumstances, (i) is true and (ii) is false: At t″, (i) expresses
a true proposition and (ii) does not. So, (i) cannot be
replaced without changing truth-value by (ii).

Th erefore, (i) is not reducible to (ii). So, I*-sentences
like (i) are irreducible to their non-I* counterparts, like
(ii)—counterparts that express propositions lacking
fi rst-person constituents. (Th is bears out the earlier claim
that I*-sentences are not instances of “x believes that x is
F.”) Since (ii) is the most plausible non-fi rst-person candi-
date for the reduction of (i), we can conclude that (i) is not
reducible simpliciter .

2. If I*-sentences are not reducible, then I*-properties are
not reducible.

I*-sentences express I*-propositions that contain
I*-concepts, and—as I argued in the pre ceding section—
I*-concepts express I*-properties. So, if I*-sentences are
not reducible, then they express I*-properties. (I am using

9 . For possible-worlds advocates (like Stalnaker 2008): A possible world in which Jones
loses his I*-belief is a diff erent possible world—diff erent things happen—from a pos-
sible world in which Jones retains his I*-belief. One set of worlds is compatible with
Jones’s beliefs at t, and a diff erent set of worlds is compatible with Jones’s beliefs at t’.
At t’, Jones had the non-I*-counterpart of his I*-belief that he* was wealthy without
his fi rst-person belief; as a result, he did what he never would have done before he was
abducted: he found work as a farmhand.

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“express I*-properties” here as short for “express proposi-
tions that contain I*-concepts that express I*-properties.”)
So, I*-properties expressed by irreducible I*-sentences
must also be irreducible. If I*-properties were reduc-
ible, then they would be entailed by non-fi rst-person
properties. In that case, the I*-sentences that express
the I*-properties would be replaceable without change
of truth value by non-fi rst-person sentences. But we
have just seen that the I*-sentences are not replaceable
salva veritate by non-fi rst-person sentences. Th erefore, if
I*-sentences are not reducible, then I*-properties are not
reducible.

3. I*-sentences are not eliminable.
Th e story about Jones also shows that I*-sentences are not

eliminable. One of the main purposes that I*-sentences
and thoughts expressed by them serve is to rationally
guide action. Rationally guiding action is a vital human
purpose. When Jones came to believe that Jones was
wealthy, but not that he* was wealthy, he took work as
a farmhand. If Jones had continued to believe that he*
was wealthy, he would have gone back to his opulent for-
mer way of life. Th e purpose of guiding action cannot be
achieved without beliefs expressed by I*-sentences. No
propositional att itude lacking a self-concept could move
Jones to resume his former black-tie-and-champagne life.
Certainly, his belief that Jones (who was in fact himself)
was wealthy was impotent to restore Jones to his former
station.

4. If I*-sentences are not eliminable, then I*-properties are
not eliminable.

I*-sentences express I*-propositions that contain
I*-concepts, and I*-concepts express I*-properties. We

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I N D E X

247

Jackson, Frank, 5, 176
James, William, 206
Johnston, Mark, xxiii, 160–68

and Paradox of Auto-alienation, 161–33,
164

Judt, Tony, 167

Kagan, Jerome, 129
Kahneman, Daniel, 64
Kaplan, David, xiv, xx, 38n10
Kim, Jaegwon, 7, 8, 10, 25, 209, 216–21,

225n24, 229–30, 233n
on emergence, 221, 223–24
on levels, 221–32
on supervenience, 217n11, 217n16, 218,

222–23, 232
Kitcher, Philip, xviii, 5, 11, 25, 26, 114

on origin of ethics, 22–24
Kornblith, Hilary, xviii, 5, 29, 119, 210,

212, 213n6, 214n8, 215, 231
on nonreductive naturalism, 11–12, 16,

17, 114
Kripke, Saul, xviii, 139n, 164
Kurtz, Paul, 4

language, 129–40
and concepts, 131–33,
and thought, 131–3, 141
social presuppositions of, 132–37

levels, ontological, 157–58, 169, 209–10,
221–25, 227

Lewis, David, xviii, 10n9, 25, 38n10,
129,146

and self-ascription, 57
Lewis, Michael, 129
Lierse, Caroline, 168
Lowe, E.J., 219n15

Macarthur, David, 13, 14, 99
Machery, Edouard, 132n
Mach, Ernst, 38–39, 54, 65, 69
Malcolm, Norman, 133n7
Matt hews, Gareth B., 33, 38n10,

153n,198
McKitrick, Jennifer, 176
mereology, 9n8, 154n12, 158, 210, 226
Merricks, Trenton, 155n15

Metzinger, Th omas, xxiii, 80
consequences of self-model view,

96–100
phenomenal content, 92–6
self-models, 84–87

mind-independence, xxii, 221
Mithen, S., 157
Moore, G.E., 84
moral responsibility, 183, 200–05

and robust fi rst-person perspective, 200
suffi cient conditions for, 203–26

Morgan, C. Lloyd, 223
Mumford, Stephen, 155

Nagel, Ernest, 7
Nagel, Th omas, xiii, xiv, xv, xix, 181

and religious temperament, 21
naturalism,

characterized, 1–7
varieties of,

epistemological, xvi, 5
liberal, 12–16
methodological, 62
ontological, xvi-xviii, 109–22, 116

scientifi c types of,
nonreductive, 10–17, 220
reductive, 6–10

naturalization
by elimination, 15, 29, 101
by reduction, 29, 101, 115
of fi rst-person perspective, 54

near-naturalism, 207–08, 218–20,
232–34

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 24
Nisbett , Richard, 68n10
Noë, Alva, 177
non-Cartesian views, xvi, xxiii, 139–40,

149, 163–64
Noonan, Harold,150n7, 150n9, 152
Noordhof, Paul, 219n15

O’Brien, Lucy, 42n16
Ogunnaike, Oludamini, 135
ontology, xvi, 3–6, 48, 56, 61–62, 113, 123,

169, 182, 231
ontology-at-t vs. ontology-simpliciter,

171–72

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I N D E X

248

Parfi t, Derek, 146, 154n13
Pargett er, Robert, 176
Peacocke, Christopher, 133n6
Penn, Derek C. 133n5
Pereboom, Derk, 29, 206n, 209, 212,

213n6, 214n8, 215n, 225n23
Perry, John xv, xvii, xxiii, 38n10, 49,

197, 201n
and the messy shopper, 49–54
and self-notions, 51–54
and refl exive content, 55–6

persistence conditions, 144–48, 156, 160,
168, 184, 224

fi rst-personal, 148–49
person, human, 127–28, 141–43, 145–47,

160
beginning of, 40–41, 166
distinctive features of, 184–86
essentially embodied, 41, 141
essentially bearer of fi rst-person

perspective, 128
from consciousness to self-

consciousness, 127–40, 141–42
persistence of, 144–45, 147–48, 165,

168
See also constitution, of persons

personal identity, diachronic, 147–50,
156

Pinker, Steven, 44n20
Plantinga, Alvin, xvi
Povinelli, Daniel J., 44, 45, 189n5
practical realism, 208
Prior, Elizabeth, 176
properties, 28, 170–72

basic, 156
dispositional, 173
irreducible, 109–20
exemplication of, 149

property-constitution, 210–12
and causality, 212–20
and supervenience 219–20

Putnam, Hilary, 26, 29

Quine, W.V.O., xvi, 4, 14

Rea, Michael, xvi, 4
Rosenberg, Alex, 6, 17n13, 18–21, 25, 159

Ross, Lee, 68n10
Russell, Bertrand, 38

Schaff er, Jonathan, 7
Schlick, Moritz, 37
Schmitt , Frederick F., 114
Searle, John 61

and subjective ontology 62
Segal, Gabriel, 21n15
self, the, 36, 51, 54–55, 82–83

as distinct from the person, 161–62,
157–58

as illusory, 162–63
as product of self-model, 80–99

self-consciousness, 127–40
See fi rst-person perspective, robust

self-concept, 33, 35, 103–04, 137
self-interpretation, 67
self-model theory, 80–99
Sellars, Wilfrid, 5
Shoemaker, Sydney, 146
Shook, John, 4
Sober, Elliott , 219n15
Sorabji, Richard, 129
Sorenson, Roy, 13
Steuber, Karston, 184
Stevens, John D., 138n
supervenience, 8, 29, 84, 86, 88–9, 95, 115,

116, 149n5, 176–77, 219–20, 232
Swinburne, Richard, 146

Th omas, E.M, 134n8
Tomasello, Michael, 130–31
Th ompson, Evan, 177

Van Inwagen, Peter, 154, 163n21, 209
Velleman, J. David, xvii, 49
Voltolini, Alberto, xvii, 12–16, 17n12,

26, 209
Vonk, Jennifer, 44, 189n5

Ward, Robert, 134
Wierenga, Edward R., 180n
Williams, Bernard, xxi, 38
Witt genstein, Ludwig, 41n13, 133

Zahavi, Dan, 31

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