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TitleEvolutionary Psychology, Public Policy and Personal Decisions
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Table of Contents
Part I: Methodological and Philosophic Considerations
	1 Public Policy and Personal Decisions: The Evolutionary Context
	2 The Essence of Evolutionary Psychology: An Introduction
	3 Beyond Sociobiology: A Kinder and Gentler Evolutionary View of Human Nature
	4 Darwin and Evolutionary Moral Psychology
Part II: Cognitive ana Affective Psychological Processes
	5 Mentalism and Mechanism: The Twin Modes of Human Cognition
	6 Self-Deception: Helping and Hindering Public and Personal Decision Making
	7 Ancestral Emotions, Current Decisions: Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Explore the Role of Emotions in Decision Making
	8 Natural Law and Natural Selection: Deontic Reasoning as Part of Evolved Human Nature
Part III: Real-World Applications
	9 Marital Cooperation and Conflict
	10 The Pornography Debate: What Sex Differences in Erotica Can Tell About Human Sexuality
	11 Why Don't Men Pay Child Support? Insights From Evolutionary Psychology
	12 Evolutionary Life History Perspective on Rape
	13 Women in the Workplace: Evolutionary Perspectives and Public Policy
	14 Is Psychopathy a Pathology or a Life Strategy? Implications for Social Policy
	15 Cultivating Morality and Constructing Moral Systems: How to Make Silk Purses From Sows' Ears
	16 Darwinism and Public Policy: The View From Political Science
Author Index
Subject Index
Document Text Contents
Page 2

Evolutionary Psychology,

Public Policy
ana Personal Decisions

Page 196


soning processes of their own (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989). Many more hazards are
inherently nonsocial and even in cases where the predatory behavior of conspe-
cifics is involved (e.g., theft), it is questionable whether many of these interactions
should be considered social. Hence, avoiding hazards draws more broadly on in-
ferences made via the physical stance or more specialized inference procedures for
dealing artifacts, animals, and contamination.

The role of intent, in particular, highlights the differences between social ex-
change and hazard management. When individuals make an offer to engage in a
cooperative exchange, an important consideration in deciding whether or not to
accept the person's offer is an assessment of whether he intends to honor his side of
the bargain. If the conclusion is that he does not, it is unlikely that the offer will be
accepted. When deciding whether to accept precautionary advice, it is necessary to
ask whether the hazard really does exist and whether the proposed protection wil l
work. Intent is not an issue, what are important are the physical and biological con-
tingencies of the situation.

Even after a violation has occurred, intent exerts a differential influence on rea-
soning about social contracts and precautions. Intent is an important mitigating
factor when judging the violation of a social contract. If two people have a deal
whereby they reciprocate driving each other to the airport to avoid the cost of park-
ing their car, then it makes a difference whether individuals violate the agreement
because their car broke down or because they chose to stay at home and watch a
football game instead. People tend to feel that an accidental violation, when un-
foreseen, is excusable, whereas an intentional violation is not. However, if a
mother tells her child to wear an oven mitt when taking something hot out of the
oven, it makes little difference whether the child forgot the rule and accidentally
reached in to grab a pan or whether the child intentionally disobeyed the mother's
rule and grabbed the pan. Either way, the child gets burned and that is what is rele-
vant in this case.

The differential influence of actor intent can also be demonstrated on the selec-
tion task. For example, Fiddick (2004, exp. 3) presented people with four different
versions of the selection task. Two versions of the task employed social contracts
and two employed precautions. Within each content domain, actor intent was inde-
pendently manipulated: The rule was either violated intentionally or accidentally.
Although actor intent had no influence on performance on the precaution versions
of the task, performance on the social contract versions of the task was selectively
impaired in the accidental violation condition.

As already noted, unlike many nonhuman systems of reciprocity where the
items of exchange are fixed, the "benefits" exchanged in human systems of reci-
procity are often based on a particular individual's needs or desires. Hence, in or-
der to determine whether any one party has illicitly benefited, it is often
necessary to model the desires of that person in order to determine whether that
person did indeed perceive the item of exchange to be a benefit—drawing once
again on ToMM's ability to form representations of others' mental states. This
highlights the importance of social perspective to cheater detection, yet another

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dimension in which reasoning about social exchange ought to differ from reason-
ing about hazards.

Recall the switched perspective effect that we referred to earlier in the discus-
sion of deontic versions of the selection task. Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) ob-
served that participants in their experiment could be made to select either the P
and not-Q cards or the not-P and Q cards, depending on the perspective that they
were cued to adopt. Social exchanges are inherently social, the interaction of two
parties with diverging interests, and hence Gigerenzer and Hug argued that in
many social exchanges there are bilateral cheating options where one or the
other party to the exchange can cheat. The adaptive problem is for individuals to
detect the cheating of their partner, not themselves, so participants cued into the
perspective of one party should seek to find evidence of cheating by their partner
resulting in a complementary pattern of selection task performance. This is in-
deed what they found.

Hazards typically are not social, so even though a precautionary rule may re-
late the actions of two parties, there is no reason to expect any principled differ-
ence in reasoning as a function of social perspective. The hazard objectively
exists or it does not, it is not a matter of personal desires, but a factual matter (see
Fiddick, 2004, exp. 1). Hence, there is no reason to expect any difference in rea-
soning performance across perspectives on the hazard—all parties should per-
ceive the same objective facts of the matter and reason in a similar fashion.
Fiddick (2000) tested this analysis of the perspective switching effect by design-
ing parallel social contract and precaution versions of the selection task and ma-
nipulating the perspective that participants were cued to adopt. Although the
perspective manipulation had an effect on performance of the social contract ver-
sions of the task, the same manipulation had no influence on performance of the
precaution versions of the task.

These findings are further reinforced by the striking case of R. M. (see Stone
et al., 2002). R.M. is a neurological patient who suffered bilateral damage to his
orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and anterior temporal cortex. As a result. R. M.
has significant difficulties with social intelligence, including a marked impair-
ment in his ability to recognize and reason about others' mental states. Stone and
her colleagues gave R. M. a battery of social contract and precaution versions of
the Wason selection task. Where normal participants and brain-damaged con-
trols had no difficulty solving either the social contract or precaution versions of
the selection task, with performance on both versions of the task being nearly
identical, R. M. was specifically impaired in his performance on the social con-
tract versions of the task (i.e., specifically those versions of the task that are hy-
pothesized to tap social intelligence). There were practically no performance
differences between R. M. and normal participants on the precaution problems.
When considering both the moral developmental evidence for domain distinc-
tions and the selection task studies reviewed in this section, there are multiple
converging lines of evidence supporting the proposed multiple adaptation ac-
count of deontic reasoning.

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as predictor of child support, 234, 242
of single-parent families, 232
status seeking and male fitness, 277
See also Economics; Social dominance

Sociopathy. See Psychopathy
Somatic marker hypothesis, 155
Spatial ability, sex differences, 278, 281
Spousal abuse and assault

and cues of adultery, 206-208
and male sexual proprietariness, 209t
and public policy on families. 348
in stepfamilies, 202-203. 211. 212f

Stalking. See Spousal abuse and assault
State, defined. 350

and child abuse, 202, 211
parental investment, 198-202. 210-212.

public policy on, 346-348
and spousal violence, 202-203. 211.

See also Divorce: Families: Marriage

Stereotypes, 137.286-287
Substance abuse. 302-304. 329-330
Sullivan. H. S.. 102
Super-cooperators. in political theory, 351
Superstition, as mental culture, 109-110
Survival prospects. See Mortality
Symmetry, as mate value indicator, 7
Sympathy, indicator of commitment. 59-60

Tabula rasa, 24
See also Domain theory

Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), 286

Technology, as material culture, 112
TFT (Tit for Tat). See Tit for Tat (TFT)
Theory of bodies, as psychological

adaptation. 107-108
Theory of mind

computational theory of mind, 170-171
defined, 100
in development, 101
intentional stance. 179-181. 183-184
as psychological adaptation, 104-107
and self-deception, 124
See also Mentalism

Threats, in Prisoner's Dilemma. 149-150
Time scale

psychology of, under poor survival
prospects. 266

of reproductive effort and antisocial
behavior. 301-306

and reproductive value. 210
and success of Tit for Tat. 325
temporal discounting in commitment.

time since divorce as predictor of child

support. 236
Tinbergen. N.. 100
Tit for Tat (TFT)

as conditional cooperation. 325
and reciprocal altruism. 55. 152-154
self-deception, role of. 128. 129t
variations on. 62-63
See also Game theory: Prisoner's


among moral obligations. 77-79
between family and employment. 282
in policy choice. 344
between quantity and quality of

offspring. 254
See also Cost/benefit comparisons

True pathologies, definition and
examples. 13-15. 14t

Ultimate cause, defined. 53

See also Explanations
Ultimatum game. 57-58. 158-159

See also Game theory
Umwelt. defined. 117

of legal systems. 189-190
of marriage. 203
of moral psychology and codes. 84-86.

93-94. T71-172
of primary rules of obligation. 187-188
of themes in erotica. 219. 222

Universities, sex discrimination. 287-289
Utilitarianism. 76-79. 86. 91
Utopias. 11
Uxoricide. See Laws: Spousal abuse and


evolutionary and developmental

background. 251
interaction with facts, in public policy.


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in moral psychology, 80
and science, 5-7
See also Moral psychology; Moral

Vengeance, as commitment, 60-61
Verbal ability, 278, 281-282

Waist-to-hip ratio (WHR), 7, 219

as male risk taking, 258-259
mortality and rape, 270
and self-deception, 125
women in combat, 284-285

"Warp drive" explanations, 28
Wason selection task

in deontic studies, 173-177, 174f, 175f

drinking age problem, 175f, 189-190
social exchange vs. precaution, 181-182
switched perspective effect, 184

Westermark effect, 15, 39-41, 40f
Women. See Sex differences

physical demands, 280-281
sex differences, in work psychology.

sex differences, policy implications,


Yanomamo, social stratification in, 265
Young male syndrome, and psychopathy,


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