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TitleComplex Democracy: Varieties, Crises, and Transformations
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Table of Contents
                            Contents
Complex Democracy: An Introduction
	1 Variety
	2 Crisis
	3 Transformation
	References
Part I: Varieties
	Varieties of Democracy: `Proporzdemokratie´, `Consensus Democracy´, Liberal Democracy and Direct Democracy
		1 Introduction
		2 Four Dimensions of Democracy
		3 The Configuration of Democracies in the Four-Dimensional Space
			3.1 Lijphart´s Conceptual Map
			3.2 The Liberal Dimension
			3.3 Direct and Representative Democracy
		4 Conclusion
		References
	The Four Worlds of Democracy: Commentary on Arend Lijphart´s Revised Edition of Patterns of Democracy (2012)
		1 Majoritarian and Consensus Democracies as per Lijphart (2012)
		2 The Four Worlds of Democracy: Structures of Democracy in 36 Countries, According to Lijphart (2012)
		3 Forms of Democracy and Political Performance
		4 Is Consensus Democracy the Only Road to Success?
		5 All That Glitters Is Not Gold: Weaknesses of Consensus Democracy
		6 Democratic Structures, Public Policy and Party Politics
		7 Conclusion
		Appendix
		References
	`Proporz´ or Polarization? The Religious Cleavage, the Division on the Left and the Party Systems of Southern Europe
		1 Modes of Conflict Resolution and `Kulturkreise´
		2 Catholic Monopoly, Liberal Nation Building and Political Polarization in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
		3 Urban-Rural-Industrial: Basic Political Coalition Options in the Interwar Period
		4 Party Systems, Party Strengths and the ``Political Sphere´´ in Southern Europe
		5 Polarization or Proporz?
		References
	Lehmbruch Versus Lijphart: Comparing Democratic Governments as Multidimensional Regimes
		1 Two Approaches to Study Negotiation Democracies
		2 Multidimensionality of Democratic Government
		3 Varieties of Democracy
		4 Tensions and Dynamics
		5 Conclusion
		References
	A Delicate Relationship: Austria´s Oversensitivity-Germany´s Undersensitivity?
		1 The Background of the ``Anschluss´´-Movement in Austria
		2 The Experience of the Years Between 1938 and 1945
		3 Germany: The Defining Other?
		4 No ``Germanic´´ System
		5 Germany and Austria Today
		References
	Latent Institutional Elasticity: The Demise of Communism in the East Germany 1989/1990 and Gerhard Lehmbruch´s Concept of Admi...
		1 Introduction: Gerhard Lehmbruch´s Non-Weberian Approach to Public Administration
		2 Institutional Stability Through Latent Change of Purpose or How to Cope with the Shift from Gradual to Shock-Like Transition
		3 But the Band Played on
		4 Birth of the Treuhandanstalt
		5 The Politicization of the Currency Union and the Staatsvertrag of May 18, 1990
			5.1 The Changing Role of the Treuhandanstalt
		6 The Second Treuhandgesetz of June 17, 1990
		7 Patterns of Institutional Stabilization: Cooptation and Cooperation
		8 Conclusion: Latent Institutional Elasticity
		References
	Can There Be a Normative Theory of Corporate Political Power?
		1 Introduction
		2 Problems in Liberal Democratic and Free-Market Theories
		3 Towards a Normative Theory of Corporate Power
			3.1 A Defence of Oligopoly
			3.2 New Public Management
			3.3 Legitimating Unequal Lobbying Power
			3.4 The Superiority of Financial Knowledge
			3.5 Corporate Social Responsibility
		4 Conclusions
		References
Part II: Crises
	No Exit from the Euro-Rescuing Trap?
		1 Prologue: My Many Debts to Gerhard Lehmbruch
		2 The End of Legitimacy Intermediation in the Euro Crisis
			2.1 What Has Changed
			2.2 Input-Oriented Legitimacy of the Euro-Rescuing Regime
		3 Problem-Oriented Analysis: What Went Wrong
			3.1 Centralized Monetary Policy in a Non-optimal Currency Area
			3.2 The Impact of the International Financial Crisis
		4 Basic Policy Options
			4.1 Tough Luck Under Maastricht Rules
			4.2 Solidaristic Burden Sharing
			4.3 Rescue Credits, Austerity and Structural Reforms
		5 Output-Oriented Legitimacy of the Euro-Rescuing Regime
			5.1 Immediate Goals
			5.2 Fragile Improvements
			5.3 Unequal Distributive Effects
			5.4 Ambivalent Problem-Solving Effectiveness
		6 Potential Exits from the Euro-Rescuing Trap
			6.1 Majoritarian Democracy
			6.2 Unilateral Action
		7 To Conclude
		References
	Will the Present Crisis Revive the Neo-corporatist Sisyphus?
		1 Prologue
		References
	The Crisis and Germany: The Trading State Unleashed
		1 Introduction
		2 The Tamed Trading State
		3 Unleashing the Trading State
		4 The Politics of Coping with the Effects of the Unleashed Trading State
		5 Conclusion
		References
	The Public Sector in the Aftermath of the Financial and Debt Crisis: Long-Term, Neglected Consequences
		1 Introduction
		2 The Long-Term, Neglected Consequences of Austerity Measures
			2.1 Short-Term Versus Long-Term Consequences
			2.2 Economic Consequences
			2.3 Variation Across and Within Countries
		3 Union Opposition to Austerity Measures
			3.1 Risks and Dangers
			3.2 Industrial Unrest
		4 The Public Sector in Germany
			4.1 Long-Term Developments at National Level
			4.2 National and European Debt-Brakes
			4.3 Some Comparative Aspects
		5 A Broader Perspective: Far-Reaching Consequences
			5.1 Accessibility and Distribution
			5.2 Alternatives and Options
			5.3 The Impact of the Troika
			5.4 Impact on the Welfare State
		6 Outlook
		References
	When Frames Are Not Enough: Consumer Safety and National Interests in EU Financial Market Regulation
		1 Introduction
		2 The Regulation of the EU Financial Market
			2.1 Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers
			2.2 Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes
			2.3 Directive on Investor Compensation Schemes
		3 The Scope of Policy Changes and Policy Framing in the Three Policy Debates
		4 Conclusions
		References
Part III: Transformations
	Transformations of Democracy in a Globalizing World
		1 Democratic Challenges of Complex Governance
		2 Dimensions of Transformation: Party Democracy, Negotiation Democracy, and Media Democracy
		3 The Governance Trilemma: On the Incompatibility of Political Arenas and Rule Systems in Media Society
		4 Globalizing Modern Democracy: An Escape from the Trilemma?
		References
	``Post-Democracy´´ and the Public Sphere: Informality and Transparency in Negotiated Decision-Making
		1 Critique of Post-Democracy
		2 Negotiation, Deliberation, Balloting
		3 New Issues and the Conflict Lines of Negotiation Democracy
		4 Administrative Interest Intermediation
		References
	The Sustainability of Democracy: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on the Input and Output Legitimacy of Democracies
		1 Introduction
		2 Democracy and Policy Recalibration
			2.1 The Need for Policy Recalibration
			2.2 Electoral Incentives and Policy Change
			2.3 Conceptualizing Electoral Incentives as Electoral Vulnerability
			2.4 Electoral Vulnerability and Interest Intermediation
		3 The Impact of Electoral Vulnerability on Policy Recalibration
		4 Conclusions
		References
	Towards Post-Democracy or Complex Power Sharing? Environmental Policy Networks in Germany
		1 Introduction
		2 Policy Networks: Extension or Erosion of Democratic Politics?
		3 Comparing Policy Networks in Germany
			3.1 Chemical Control in the 1970s and 1980s
			3.2 Climate Politics in the 2010s
		4 Policy Networks as Complex Power Sharing Arrangements
		5 Conclusions
		References
	Ban on Blasphemy: Protection of Religion Versus Freedom of Opinion as a Conflict of Fundamental Rights in Democracy
		1 The History of Blasphemy
		2 Blasphemy and the Art
		3 Judicial and Political Resistance to Blasphemy
		4 Conclusion
		References
                        
Document Text Contents
Page 1

Volker Schneider · Burkard Eberlein
Editors

Complex
Democracy
Varieties, Crises, and Transformations

Page 2

Complex Democracy

Page 143

Under the pressures of the Greek crisis in early 2010, the first option was

rejected, and the second one was never seriously considered. Nevertheless, an

examination of these “nondecisions” (Bachrach and Baratz 1963) is useful for

understanding why the third option was actually adopted.

4.1 Tough Luck Under Maastricht Rules

Of the three options, the first one had been prescribed by the Maastricht rules that

had only recently been confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty: Even if the interest rate on

Greek bonds did rise to a level where the costs of refinancing the state debt would

exceed available resources, Art. 123 TFEU prevented the ECB from buying Greek

state bonds, and Art. 125 TFEU prevented the Union and all member states from

assuming any liability for Greek debts. If that meant that international capital

markets would drive the Greek state into bankruptcy, tough luck.

In institutional terms, this was also the option that would have been most easy to

adopt. The Maastricht rules were the law of the Treaty which could only be changed

by unanimous agreement among all EU governments and ratification in all member

states. In other words, every single EMU member state could have vetoed decisions

that violated these rules. But what about actor perceptions, interests and

preferences?

On the Greek side, the incoming Pasok government had won the 2009 elections

on promises of rapid economic recovery. After coming into office, however, it had

inadvertently triggered the credit crisis by announcing that its predecessors had

vastly under-reported past state deficits. From its perspective, therefore, the imme-

diate prospect of state insolvency must have appeared as a political catastrophe—

compared to which applying for European support must surely have appeared as the

lesser evil.

From the perspective of surplus states, the choice was more difficult. In

Germany, the spontaneous preference of Merkel’s conservative-liberal government

was to insist on the Maastricht rules—which, after all had been adopted at German

insistence and which also had the support of the neoliberal academic mainstream

and business press. It took a while for the government to realize that letting Greece

go bankrupt might trigger speculative attacks on the solvency of other EMU

member states whose economies had also become dependent on capital inflows—

with the consequence that the Monetary Union itself might break apart on the fault

line dividing surplus and deficit economies. If that should happen, the huge

external-credit position which surplus economies had built up during the first

decade of the Monetary Union would be at risk, and surplus states might again

have to save their domestic banks. Moreover, governments and unions also came to

realize that exports had greatly benefited from an undervalued real exchange rate,

and that a collapse of the euro was likely to produce a major revaluation of nominal

exchange rates and massive job losses. After some reflection, therefore,

governments in Germany and other surplus countries realized that there were

142 F.W. Scharpf

Page 144

good self-interested reasons for not rejecting the request for assistance in resolving

the Greek solvency crisis.

4.2 Solidaristic Burden Sharing

The second approach might have been familiar to policy makers and the public in

Germany since it was the one they had chosen in dealing with the consequences

national unification after 1990. When vastly diverging real exchange rates were

wiping out industries and jobs in East Germany, monetary union was quasi-

automatically followed by social and fiscal union. In effect, West-East transfers

supporting social security, public infrastructure and economic investment have

amounted to about 3 % of GDP over more than 20 years. And while transfers of

this magnitude may be unlikely in the Eurozone, a solidaristic “framing” would

indeed have suggested policy responses differing greatly from the ones that were

actually chosen.

It is now widely accepted that an immediate commitment either to jointly

secured Eurobonds or to OMT interventions by the ECB would have put an end

to both, the Greek state-credit crisis and the threat of an imminent euro crisis

(De Grauwe 2012). Once that fear had been allayed, there would then have been

time to assess the causes of the crisis and the effectiveness and normative appropri-

ateness of potential remedies from an inclusive perspective. If the euro was to be

saved and external devaluation was ruled out, policy discussion would then have

turned to “internal devaluation” as a way to achieve external balance through wage

and price cuts. But as that would also have highlighted institutional obstacles,

counterproductive economic effects and enormous social costs, inclusive policy

discussion and negotiations could not have avoided focusing on the need to mitigate

these problems through European or transnational social transfers and investment

subsidies. Hence agreed-upon solutions would not only have required difficult

internal adjustments in deficit economies but also substantial fiscal contributions

from surplus states.
4

But such options were not seriously considered in the spring

of 2010.

An obvious reason is that in institutional terms they would have been most

difficult to adopt. Since they would have directly violated the Maastricht rules, they

would have required Treaty amendments supported by all EMU member states or at

least an international-law treaty among Eurozone states. But given these institu-

tional obstacles, such options could only have succeeded if they had had

4
It is also suggested by Keynesian economists that a solidaristic response would have required a

strong expansion of domestic demand through deficit spending, wage increases and higher

inflation rates in Germany and other surplus economies (De Grauwe 2013). Even if that were

institutionally feasible, however, the effect on GIIPS economies would be quite small as the share

of Germany in the export and import balances of GIIPS economies, and vice versa, has been

greatly reduced after 2008 (Erber 2012).

No Exit from the Euro-Rescuing Trap? 143

Page 286

• Criminal law is seen as the ultima ratio;

• If personal rights of victims were violated, civil law can also be considered;

• Measures of media legislation like warnings or operational restrictions can be

important in order to ‘sustainably secure the positive peace order’;

• Voluntary self-control as in the movie industry could be an option;

• Besides its legal responsibilities, it is the duty of the state not to foster blas-

phemy, which could have consequences for cultural promotion (Isensee

2007: 133).

A constitutional state generally grants an equal amount of freedom to action and

reaction as well as press and religion. Protection of Islam cannot be provided if it

does not derive from a form of Christianity found in the particular country. The

state has to comply, however, with tight boundaries for regulation, especially with

the principle of proportionality. Pope Benedict criticized this ‘new wave of dra-

matic enlightenment or secularism’ on his trip to Bavaria in 2006, as if the state

would have the power to stop such a societal trend by resigning defaults.

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