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TitleChinese Responses to US Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense
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Page 93

Option One: Conventional Modernization “Plus” 71

controlling our intelligence, can correct judgments of the battle-
field be made, correct operational guidance given, and informa-
tion attacks and firepower attacks correctly organized to paralyze
enemy operational systems and maintain the concealment of
operational movement in order to accomplish campaign goals.68

Perhaps because intelligence collection forms the basis of information
superiority, one source states, “before an operation, or in the opening
stages of an operation, enemy reconnaissance and early warning sys-
tems must be struck.”69 This statement is echoed in another source,
which states, “When a campaign starts, the main tasks of an informa-
tion operation are to attack enemy reconnaissance systems and imple-
ment campaign information deception to conceal our operational
intent and protect the start of our campaign force.”70

Other types of satellites, however, have also been discussed as
targets. Considering the PLA’s emphasis on attacking command and
control targets, it is not surprising that attacking communication sat-
ellites has been discussed. One source states:

Jamming satellite communications can block the main channel
of information flow. The enemy’s naval force and its national
military command authorities, naval command centers and
other force links mainly rely on high frequency satellite commu-
nications and microwave communications and all other satellite
communications, including commercial and military satellite
communications, all of which are easily susceptible to electronic
interference and deception. In regards to this point, we can use
ground-based high-powered satellite communication jammers or
vessels installed with high frequency satellite communication

____________
68 Xu Yuanxian ( ), “Future Basic Methods of Our Army’s Information Warfare”
( ), in Military Studies Editorial Department, Research
o n Our Army�s Information Warfare Issues, Beijing: National Defense University Press
( ), 1999, p. 29.
69 Wang Huying ( ), “The Basic Principles and Campaign Methods of Information
Attacks” ( ), in Military Studies Editorial Department,
Research on Our Army�s Information Warfare Issues, Beijing: National Defense University
Press, 1999, p. 82.
70 Dai (1999), p. 313.

Page 94

72 Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for DoD

jammers against the transmitters of high frequency satellites used
by large naval forces in order to enter into an advantageous posi-
tion within the wave shape coverage of the communication sat-
ellite transmitter. We can then jam the satellite’s transmitter at
its source, destroying its normal operation and interrupting sat-
ellite communication with the outside. We can also deploy elec-
tronic interference aircraft to conduct suppression or deception
at the source against ship-borne WSC-3 high frequency com-
munication satellite receivers and SSR-1 satellite signal receiv-
ers.71

In addition, because of the United States’ reliance on satellite
positioning for targeting, the U.S. GPS system may also be a target. A
Liberation Army Daily article outlines three vulnerabilities of the GPS
system. First, it notes, the GPS signal can be easily jammed by signals
produced by commercial television stations, satellite communications,
and mobile satellite terminals.72 Another method is to use space-
based jammers to disrupt the GPS signal at its source.73 Second,
altering the signal to avoid jamming is difficult and would have nega-
tive consequences for global transportation. Finally, GPS satellites are
vulnerable to direct attack.74 Another Liberation Army Daily article
states that “the optimal method for dealing with coordinate warfare is
to destroy the opposition’s NAVSTAR satellites or to use the same
coordinate warfare methods to counter attack the opposition’s vital
targets.”75 But jamming the GPS signal does not need to be complex.
It is reportedly inexpensive and can be purchased with off-the-shelf
____________
71 Nie (1999), p. 185.
72 Shi Chunmin, “War Is Aimed at the Soft Rib of GPS, ( GPS ‘ ’),”
Liberation Army Daily (online), January 15, 2003.
73 Zhu Rinzhong, “The Theory of GPS and Methods of Countering It,” Junshi Xueshu, May
1999; Dean Cheng, “The Chinese Space Program: A 21st Century Fleet in Being,” in James
C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, A Poverty of Riches: New Challenges and Opportunities
in PLA Research, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CF-189-NSRD, 2003, p. 46.
Interfering with a GPS signal involves jamming the GPS receivers, not transmitters. In this
case, the author is advocating an ill-advised tactic.
74 Shi (2003).
75 Liu Sunshan, “Military Experts Believe That Coordinate War Is Coming onto the War-
fare Stage,” Liberation Army Daily, June 13, 2001.

Page 186

164 Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for DoD

U.S. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National
Intelligence Estimate, 2001.

Wang Houqing ( ) and Zhang Xingye ( ), eds., Science of
Campaigns ( ), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000.

Wang Hucheng, “The U.S. Military’s Soft Ribs and Strategic Weaknesses,”
Xinhua, July 5, 2000 [in FBIS as “Liaowang on US Military’s ‘Strategic
Weaknesses’,” July 5, 2000, FBIS document CPP20000705000081].

Wang Huying ( ), “The Basic Principles and Campaign Methods of
Information Attacks” ( ), in Military Studies
Editorial Department, Research on Our Army�s Information Warfare Issues,
Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999, p. 82.

Wei Jincheng, “New Form of People’s War,” Jiefangjun bao, June 25, 1996,
p. 6 [in FBIS as “Military Warfare with Chinese Characteristics,” June
25, 1996, FBIS document FTS19960625000057].

Wei Yuejiang ( ), “Our Army Explores New Methods for
Countering Enemy Over the Horizon Operations” ( :

), Liberation Army Daily
( ) (online), January 27, 2003, www.people.com.cn/
GB/junshi/62/20030127/915070.html (as of February 2005).

Wolf, Charles, Jr., K. C. Yeh, Benjamin Zycher, Nicholas Eberstadt, and
Sung-Ho Lee, Fault Lines in China�s Economic Terrain , Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1686-NA/SRF, 2003.

Xie, Andy, “Why High-Speed Growth Won’t Solve China’s Financial
Problems,” SCMP.com, January 27, 2003.

Xie Yonggao ( ), Qin Zizeng ( ), and Huang Haibing
( ), “Looking at the Past and Future of Military Aero-
space Technology” ( ), China Aerospace
( ), No. 6, 2002. Online at http://www.spacechina.com/
index.asp?modelname=zz_nr&recno=55 (as of January 2005).

Xu Yuanxian ( ), “Future Basic Methods of Our Army’s Information
Warfare” ( ), in Military Studies Edi-
torial Department, Research on Our Army�s Information Warfare Issues ,
Beijing: National Defense University Press ( ), 1999, pp.
29–36.

Page 187

References 165

Yeh, K. C., “China’s Economic Growth: Recent Trends and Prospects,” in
Shuxun Chen and Charles Wolf, Jr., eds., China, the United States, and
the Global Economy, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-
1300-RC, 2001, pp. 69–98.

Zhang Jianhong ( ), “Operations to Achieve Campaign Information
Control” ( ), in Military Studies Editorial
Department, Research on Our Army�s Information Warfare Issues, Beijing:
National Defense University Press, 1999 pp. 68–75.

Zhu Rinzhong, “The Theory of GPS and Methods of Countering It,” Jun-
shi Xueshu, May 1999, pp. 58–59.

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